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IRAN (FEW STORIES)

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ON PAGE 3

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
19 March 1980

Newest spy charge adds to US-Iran strains

Iranian woman linked to CIA, including \$300 a month 'salary'

By Ralph Joseph
Special to The Christian Science Monitor

Tehran, Iran
Iran's relations with the United States are likely to be still further strained by the latest twist in the lingering tale of the 50 American hostages being held by militant students here in Tehran.

Iran's pasdars (revolutionary guards) announced March 18 that they had arrested an Iranian Foreign Ministry official on spy charges. And the woman, Victoria Bassiri, was said to have assisted one of the American hostages, William Daugherty, in espionage operations both before the revolution against the Shah and after it.

The pasdars said that Ms. Bassiri had been arrested at the Foreign Ministry six days earlier. She is described as an Iranian Christian who was employed in the Foreign Ministry as an undersecretary. The specific charge against her was of "closely cooperating" with William Daugherty and passing on to him "secret and important documents" from the Iranian Foreign Ministry.

The guards said that Ms. Bassiri had received \$300 a month for her alleged undercover services, though receiving a salary of about 100,000 rials a month (nearly \$1,428 at the official rate) from the ministry.

A statement by the revolutionary guards said Mr. Daugherty was an agent of the US Central Intelligence Agency and was being held as a hostage in the US Embassy by the student militants. Mr. Daugherty's name has appeared previously with those of other alleged "CIA agents" whom the student militants have said they are holding.

Though sources close to Iran's Revolutionary Council have said previously that none of the hostages being held by the militants would be put on trial, observers here believe it almost certain that Mr. Daugherty will be taken before an Islamic revolutionary court when Ms. Bassiri is brought up for trial. This is likely to produce sharp reactions from the Carter administration, which has vigorously rejected the idea of any of the hostages being brought to trial.

Earlier this month, Iranian Foreign Minister Sadeq Ghotbzadeh prevented a heightening of the US-Iran crisis by refusing to hand American diplomat Victor Tomseth to the revolutionary court. He was sought by the prosecutor to answer questions on alleged connections between the US Embassy and Iran's fanatical rightist "Forghan" terrorist group, some of whose members were being tried.

Mr. Tomseth, who had taken refuge in the Iranian Foreign Ministry in early November, along with charge d'affaires Bruce Laingen and another US diplomat, Michael Holland, had already been questioned by an official of the revolutionary court through an interpreter.

Even this procedure produced a strong reaction from the White House. And when revolutionary prosecutor general Ali Qoddussi demanded that Mr. Tomseth should be produced in court in person, Mr. Ghotbzadeh put his foot down.

But in Mr. Daugherty's case there would be nothing to prevent his being handed over to the revolutionary court to answer questions about his relationship with Ms. Bassiri.

Why this particular moment has been chosen to pick up Ms. Bassiri and why the arrest was only announced March 18 although it was made on March 12, two days before the majlis (national assembly) elections, puzzles observers here.

There is speculation that this may be the latest move by the powerful Islamic Republican Party, bastion of the religious fundamentalists, to win support for itself in the run-off majlis elections due in early April. Ayatollah Mousavi Khoeini, the clerical mentor of the student militants in the embassy, is a leading Tehran candidate and an IRP member. Results of the March 14 first round of the majlis elections are still coming in. They indicate the IRP is holding the lead. But criticisms that it has been indulging in malpractices in the elections are widespread and continue to grow.

Iran's Revolutionary Council was scheduled to discuss the question of alleged malpractices, including vote rigging, late March 18. At time of writing it had not decided whether the entire elections should be canceled, as some are demanding, or whether the poll should be declared void only in areas where vote rigging and other malpractices have been proved.

The decision of the Revolutionary Council is doubly interesting because more than half of the council's members are believed to be members of the IRP.

It would obviously be of advantage to Mr. Bani-Sadr if results in areas where the IRP has won were to be canceled. Up to now, his group has been trailing the Islamic Republicans.

NEVADA APPEAL
Carson City, Nevada
10 March 1980

Covert action the only answer for Iran

After the events of this weekend, how can the United States deal seriously with the government of Iran — a government that doesn't even communicate with itself on key issues?

It was announced by Iranian officials that the U.S. hostages would be moved to a location that would allow them to be interviewed by a U.N. commission investigating charges against the shah of Iran and his administration.

Then, we were told that such a move was out of the question.

It has been announced now, that not only will those hostages not be moved, but that only those under investigation for crimes against the Iranian people in concert with the shah, will be allowed to see the U.N. commission, despite agreements by the Iranians to allow the U.N. commissioners a chance to see all the hostages, to allow them to be interviewed and to be able to verify their physical and mental condition.

If it weren't such a tragic and critical situation, we would be tempted to laugh at this unrehearsed scene from a play about a lunatic asylum. We would chuckle at the inconsistencies, the lies, the deception and outright insanity displayed in the government of Iran under the madman Khomeini.

But, it is no laughing matter and it should be clear by now that no amount of discussion, negotiation or third party intervention based on good faith is going to succeed with the illogical and unbalanced mind of Khomeini.

There has been talk, a lot of it poorly-thought out talk of sending the Marines into Iran to rescue the hostages.

Militarily, such a thrust would be doomed to failure. The hostages would be put to death the minute any U.S. military unit moved toward Teheran. There would be no staging area with the embassy being too far from the ocean. The U.S. would no longer be able to condemn the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, and, there is the threat of Soviet confrontation in Iran should the U.S. move, though the Moslem world would be less indignant over an infidel nation such as the U.S. making a move in this situation than it would the Soviet non-believers.

A military thrust, for the world to see, seems entirely out of the question and would probably result in a backlash of protest and confrontation for U.S. forces. It is apparent that normal diplomatic channels are useless in this situation.

So, what just what do we do to free our people?

Well, we hope the CIA is working on the matter. We know that the Iranian secret police of the shah and most of his military officers were trained by the CIA, and a majority of them are still loyal to the shah and the CIA. With the dissension among other tribes in Iran, the only logical thought is civil war, a bitter pill for any country to swallow.

The CIA is a tool of the president of the United States. He can and should order such covert action planning for Iran immediately, if he hasn't already.

CIA operatives, whether they be of Iranian distraction or other nationalities could be absorbed into Iranian communities waiting for the chance to strike, and building underground organizations for resistance.

With the apparent failure of Khomeini to direct his people in a progressive stance toward development, and preferring the stagnation of devoting so much energy to protests and rallies where helpless camels are slaughtered as sacrifice, Iran is ripe for the kind of revolution that Khomeini fears and has attempted to put down many times with his Revolutionary Guard.

The protests of dissenting tribes and leaders in regions far away from the Khomeini and his fanatics continue to demonstrate that he does not hold absolute rule over the people of Iran. It demonstrates too that the Iranian people are not all that satisfied with the government of Khomeini and suggests that a rebellion aided by CIA and similar organizations from allied nations could be successful if the problems met in operations in Western Europe in the 1950's and in Cuba can be avoided.

With a large scale distraction for the Khomeini government such as civil war, it may be possible for these secret operatives of the United States and other nations, to move successfully to free the hostages without the backlash of an overt military act.

Without such action, and if the government of the United States continues to deal with Iran as it has, we will only have succeeded in digging an

THE NATIONAL GUARDIAN
19 March 1980

Hostage delay: U.S. to blame

The UN commission of inquiry has failed to bring an end to the U.S.-Iran hostage crisis, and Washington is disappointed.

The events of the past week in Tehran demonstrate that the issue of the U.S. embassy "spy nest" remains a volatile one in Iranian politics, tied up with differing views of how best to continue the struggle against imperialism and advance the revolution. Resolution of the hostage conflict will continue to be a complicated process.

But regardless of how Iran proceeds at this point, responsibility for the hostage situation remains with the U.S. Washington's support of the shah caused the crisis, and its refusal to apologize for the U.S.'s criminal past in Iran prolongs it.

Between 1953, when the CIA sponsored a coup against the progressive government of Mohammed Mossadegh to maintain imperialist control of Iranian oilfields, and the shah's overthrow by the country's masses last year, the U.S. directly supported one of the most brutal and corrupt dictatorships in history. Tens of thousands of Iranians were savagely tortured and martyred in the shah's prisons; thousands more were shot down in the streets when they marched to demand freedom.

On another level, U.S. imperialism was largely responsible for the distorted development of Iran's economy that gave tremendous wealth to its small bourgeois class and impoverished the rural and urban masses, leaving behind an economic mess that poses a major challenge to the revolutionary government.

And U.S. interference in Iran's affairs did not end with the shah's ouster. As documents captured by the militants at the U.S. embassy prove, the CIA continued to spy on and conspire against

the revolution and undoubtedly still does so.

If its record of oppression of Iran were not enough, the U.S. government blatantly provoked the wrath of the Iranian people last fall by admitting the despised shah into this country for medical treatment.

Throughout the resulting hostage crisis and to this day, the Carter administration has failed to acknowledge responsibility or to take steps that could resolve the conflict.

For the first several weeks, it not only refused to return the shah, but also adopted a big stick policy, sending its warships to the Arabian Sea to threaten Iran and waging economic warfare. Saying it would not be "blackmailed," Washington for many weeks prevented the establishment of the UN commission to hear Iran's grievances, even though this might have led to an early compromise.

Seeking to gain advantage from the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan, the administration subsequently softened its public stance on Iran. It allowed the UN commission to proceed, but misrepresented its primary concern to the U.S. people as the hostages, rather than the crimes of the U.S.-backed shah. And last week, by relentlessly pressuring the UN and the Iranian government on the issue of whether the panel would visit the hostages, Washington helped force the show-down which caused the commission's work to collapse.

Most important, the U.S. government continued to refuse to issue any self-criticism for its abhorrent role in Iran during the shah's murderous reign.

Clearly the U.S. owes Iran an apology—it would be small compensation for the thousands killed under its puppet. The left and progressive forces in this country should demand the Carter administration make a thoroughgoing self-criticism, and cooperate with Iran's efforts to bring the shah to justice and regain the billions he stole from the people. These forces must also let Carter know that aggression against Iran, whether economic or military, will not be tolerated.

Topics

Iranian Paranoia

Bits

Writing from Teheran, our colleague John Kifner recently noted, "The obsession of Iranian revolutionaries with plots cannot be overstated." Yet even aficionados of conspiracy theories may be startled by a story solemnly purveyed by Iranians now in exile — that America deliberately put Ayatollah Khomeini in power.

As a trusted friend recounts it, the theory goes like this: More than a year ago, American intelligence learned that the Shah was afflicted with cancer. Washington feared that the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party and its Marxist allies would seize power. Therefore — so the tale goes — the C.I.A. threw its potent support to the Ayatollah as a lesser evil, even to the extent of discouraging a military coup d'état intended to block rule by the mullahs.

Then, after the Iranian revolution, when the pro-Communist left again seemed ascendant, a diversion was

needed to preserve the Ayatollah's authority. This time, the Americans arranged the seizure of their own embassy. That gave the Islamic fundamentalists anti-American camouflage for the essentially pro-American purpose of keeping the Ayatollah in power. And there was a domestic dividend for President Carter, whose standing in polls soared just as Senator Kennedy announced his candidacy.

This theory is taken seriously by some well-educated Iranians with considerable knowledge of American life. In the turmoil of revolutionary Teheran, even more farfetched plots find credulous assent. Which suggests a paradoxical policy: perhaps the best way to counter paranoia is to exploit it. For instance, if Iranians could be persuaded to grasp the real truth — that the militants holding the American Embassy are really on the C.I.A. payroll — then the release of the American hostages might swiftly follow.

And Pieces

The militants at the American Embassy in Teheran are also obsessed with American plots. It was surprising to learn that they spent 40 hours per page piecing together papers that their captives had shredded before the seizure. How monomaniacal and wasteful. And ludicrous: Having been told by their leader to present evidence of American perfidy to the United Nations commission, the militants pursued the cars of the visitors and tried to push their deshredded handiwork through the windows. Why couldn't they have just received the commission at the embassy, or, simpler still, published the documents?

The incident suggests two larger questions as well. Couldn't American embassies store sensitive documents in computers, so that the press of a button would erase them forever? And is there no more interesting work for Iranian revolutionaries? A country has been shredded.

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MISCELLANEOUS

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LONG ISLAND NEWSDAY
21 February 1980

How to Balance Dirty Tricks And Democracy

*Undercover operations
are better than sending in
the Marines. But they do
require forgoing some
public control over them.*

By Richard K. Betts

After several years of agonizing consideration, the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee has produced a charter for America's intelligence agencies: the National Intelligence Act of 1980.

This remarkable 171-page bill refines the 1947 National Security Act's vague authorization for "special activities"—a euphemism for covert intelligence collection and political operations. All major nations engage in these activities, but none admits it, or writes such detailed permissions and restrictions into its legal code.

The new charter is a response to two conflicting pressures. First is opposition to a free rein for the CIA, which emerged from the bitter disillusionment and distrust of secrecy and authority bred by Vietnam and Watergate. This reached a peak in the mid-1970s when Congress prohibited covert action in Angola. Second is the renewed anxiety about the Soviet threat, crystallized by the Afghanistan invasion.

The Senate charter authorizes special activities but limits them, for example prohibiting assassinations or certain types of surveillance of American citizens. The charter would also make it illegal for the CIA to let its agents pose as journalists, clergymen or educators, but the agency would be allowed to obtain information from such professionals on a voluntary basis. The bill stipulates that secret activities are permitted only where overt means cannot achieve necessary goals.

Liberals worry that restraints against abuses may not be strong enough, and conservatives worry that any such legislation may hamstring necessary efforts to compete with the Soviets. And journalists of all persuasions feel that the integrity of their profession and the safety of reporters will be jeopardized by the new charter proposals.

If the United States succeeds in balancing all these concerns, it will be a unique achievement.

Because there is no world government, international politics is a jungle. To avoid being eaten by unfriendly powers, nations do things abroad that they can afford not to allow at home, where the rule of law protects people's interests. Where the KGB, the Soviet intelligence service, is secretly supplying radical revolutionary groups, forging documents that embarrass the United States or subverting friendly governments, it is not unreasonable for Americans to compete. And to be effective—for example by giving financial support to democratic non-Marxist parties, or paying local officials for inside information—some po-

litical action has to be secret.

Most Americans accept this necessity, but our tendency to agonize over it is unique. This is not just because the United States is a democracy. Most Frenchmen or Israelis, for example, see our breast-beating about distasteful covert activities as bizarre and naive. Having lived under German occupation or constantly facing the prospect of annihilation by Arabs, they have better reasons to grasp how fragile security can be in an unstable world.

Protected by two oceans and possessing more material power than any other nation, it has been natural—and not improper—for Americans to be relaxed enough to question the legitimacy of interference in other countries' affairs. Precisely because security did not seem as fragile here as in many other countries, we have been able to place a high priority on constitutional values that raise questions about clandestine political intervention. Precisely because our sense of insecurity has grown since the mid-1970s, this concern with propriety is receding.

How can covert political action serve our national interests and advance American values in the world arena? Will a more permissive writ for the CIA invite abuses again? How can we minimize the incompatibility between such activities and the Constitution? Can the CIA be controlled properly without having its operations open to wide scrutiny? The issue is not whether to "unleash" the covert operations branch of the CIA, but how long the leash should be, and who should hold it.

If we have no interest in affecting internal developments in other nations or acquiring information available only through clandestine channels, and if we see no threat in leaving the field to the USSR, we can do without vigorous covert capabilities. But such nonchalance is risky. Moreover, whether the CIA pokes around in other countries or not, we will be blamed for doing so. Anti-American critics will not believe we are born-again good guys. If we do want to compete effectively, covert action offers options between the extremes of doing nothing and landing the Marines.

But what kind of covert action? Carte blanche is dangerous: Revelations of assassination plots against Patrice Lumumba and Fidel Castro demonstrate the risk of excesses if leaders place few limits on secret schemes. Excesses are immoral but also counterproductive. Secrecy will inevitably fail in a certain number of CIA operations, and when unnecessary shocking ones are revealed, they seriously damage both the U.S. image and the very clients we want to help.

In trying to determine which distasteful activities are necessary or excusable, it is impossible to establish "proper" criteria that satisfy everyone. Here are a few examples of defensible standards.

- **Money before violence.** Supporting friendly political forces in unstable countries, or where their opponents receive aid from Moscow, is sometimes wise. Financial aid is preferable to giving them guns and encouraging them to intimidate their opponents. Only if they are fighting for their lives, like Afghan guerrillas today, should the U.S. consider getting involved in paramilitary assistance.

- **Choose clients carefully.** "The enemy of my enemy is my friend" is an old adage but a dangerous guide for policy. Aid to repressive regimes, just because they are anti-Soviet, can come back to bite us. With hindsight, the 1953 overthrow in Iran of the Mossadegh government and the restoration of the shah to power may be a case in point. It is better to avoid a choice between accepting victory by Marxist groups and propping up an unpopular, brutal ruler. But avoiding such a choice may require early involvement on behalf of moderate groups, before the lines are drawn so starkly.

- **Avoid too much commitment or too little.** The Soviets know how to probe and retreat. They take advantage of opportunities but they withdraw or take their lumps if costs become too high. If they fail, they look for another opportunity. Being thrown out of Egypt didn't lead them to avoid an effort in Angola. Americans, less cynical about international politics, tend to go whole hog or, when burned by a misadventure, to stand back and wring their hands.

Covert action is necessary only in messy situations where normal diplomacy or open involvement don't work. But it is not a panacea: Messy situations are ones where secret operations seldom produce magical results. Better covert action would not have kept the shah in power.

If the CIA's Operations Directorate is pumped up and turned loose on trouble spots, will the U.S. again wind up in embarrassing fiascos such as Chile? There is no reason that has to happen. Even at its worst, the CIA was not the "rogue elephant" described by former Intelligence Committee chairman Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) in 1975. In the course of exhaustive investigation of covert action, Church's committee found almost no cases in which the CIA undertook operations without the direction of the President or the approval of congressional oversight committees.

The question that worries informed critics is not whether the CIA can be trusted to follow orders. Rather it is whether a president can be trusted if he is not inhibited by the extensive checks and balances he faces on other matters of policy, and whether secret oversight by a small group in Congress is a sufficient

substitute for open debate.

The Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974 requires the executive to report covert operations to eight committees of Congress. It was a reaction to concern that intelligence oversight in Congress was restricted to a narrow group that might be too pliant. This number is the principal obstacle to effective secret activities because it maximizes chances that such programs will leak to the press. Movement is under way to modify the amendment by requiring that only the Senate and House Intelligence Committees be informed about operations.

There is no way around the fundamental contradiction between how a democracy makes normal policy and how a nation maneuvers in the dark reaches of international conflict. If we intend to do both—preserve democratic values while competing vigorously with the Soviets abroad—we have to be willing to delegate the responsibility for judgment and for restraining the executive branch to a small group in Congress. The public will have to trust those representatives even if it can't check what they are doing.

If critics believe this is too dangerous a price to pay, they must be willing to say we can afford to do without most secret operations.

Richard K. Betts, a former staff member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, is author of "Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises" and won a National Intelligence Study Center prize last year for the best article on intelligence. The views in this article are not those of the Brookings Institution, where he is employed.

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NEWSWEEK
24 March 1980

PERSIAN GULF

'Blowtorch Bob' Is Back on Top

On the shelf behind Robert Komer's desk in the Pentagon stands a bronzed blowtorch presented by his staff. The gag goes back to the mid-1960s when, as a special assistant to President Johnson, Komer crisscrossed the Pacific on trouble-shooting missions to Vietnam. After one such visit, the U.S. ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, remarked that having Komer in town was like having a blowtorch applied to one's rear end. The name "Blowtorch Bob" stuck. Now the man who once was the driving force behind the ill-fated "pacification" program in Vietnam is back on top. Occupying the No. 3 slot at the Pentagon,



John Ficarra—Newsweek

Komer with his trophy: 'I didn't say we could win'

Komer, 58, is in charge of another hot concept: the rapid-deployment force that is being created to meet the Soviet challenge in the Persian Gulf region.

Knocking Heads: On the drawing board for years, the rapid-deployment force is only now taking shape under Komer's prodding. Says Leslie Gelb, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former top official in the Carter State Department: "If I were looking for a civilian to knock heads and kick aside bureaucratic obstacles, I'd pick Bob Komer." The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy can be abrasive and short-fused, but he is no ogre. His effervescence is as likely to bubble over in laughter as in rage. Komer was widely criticized during the Vietnam War years for the upbeat progress reports he sent back to Washington. On one trip he boasted that "things haven't been going so good here,

but I knocked a few heads together and now you can say the pacification program is taking off." Even today, he argues that the pacification program was a success and was defeated only when North Vietnam's regular army intervened.

"I got a bum rap for being the fellow in the rose-colored glasses," he says. "I'm not an incurable optimist," Komer insists. But he adds: "When you're a senior official involved in an unpopular war, you have an obligation to talk up the idea that we're making it." He does own up to having "learned a lesson in Vietnam, which is to be careful about making optimistic predictions." And he even admits that "my advice was frequently wrong."

Komer is no newcomer to rapid deployment. At the Rand Corporation think tank and later as an adviser to candidate Jim-

my Carter, he argued that NATO's defenses should be beefed up by "pre-positioning" heavy equipment in Europe for use during any emergency. In applying the concept to the Persian Gulf region, Komer is returning to an area that he knows well. He had handled Middle East matters for John F. Kennedy's National Security Council and had been responsible for monitoring developments in Yemen's civil war. In the White House, at least, the conflict became known as "Komer's War."

Russians: Komer is careful not to promise that a U.S. force in the Indian Ocean could whip the Russians. Although he has said that "we could put up a hell of a fight right now," he points out: "I didn't say we could win." In fact, Komer seems to be saying that we couldn't win. "We could put up a respectable deployment effort," he says, "but obviously not a sufficient one."

The emergence of a can-do warrior like Komer as the Pentagon's strategic guru and bureaucratic head-knocker is an apt symbol of the Administration's tough new stance. But Komer insists that "I have never been an ideological cold warrior." As far back as the 1950s, he says, he was drafting CIA studies "designed to prove that the Soviets were not 10 feet tall." Gelb agrees that Komer is no cold warrior. "I view him basically as a professional who happens to be on the conservative side of the debate," he says. The reason for Komer's reputation as a hawk, Gelb says, is that "he's such a hard charger, a bull-in-any-shop." Now Komer is sitting in the middle of the biggest shop of his career, and the broken crockery should pile up quickly as he endeavors to make the Carter Doctrine work.

CHRYSS GALASSI with DAVID C. MARTIN
in Washington

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 41-42U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
24 March 1980

Worldwide Crackdown On Soviet Spies

The honeymoon is over for Moscow's secret agents. So-called Russian diplomats are getting bounced from New Zealand to Canada to France.

Reported from
WORLD CAPITALS

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has boomeranged on Moscow with consequences the Kremlin never expected—a worldwide crackdown on Russian espionage.

One government after another has sent Soviet envoys packing amid charges that the Russians are more interested in undercover skulduggery than diplomacy.

The incidents are seen as a serious embarrassment to Moscow, which is trying to burnish an image sorely tarnished by its unexpected invasion of Afghanistan.

Since the Russian forces marched into Afghanistan in late December, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, France and Canada have either expelled or otherwise forced Soviet officials to leave.

The U.S., too, is doing its part to embarrass the Russians. In March, the Federal Bureau of Investigation unveiled a onetime officer of the KGB, the Soviet spy agency, who was caught in the act.

Identified as Rudolph Albert Herrmann, the spy told reporters that he had spent 11 years gathering political intelligence for Russia while seeming to live a humdrum existence as a freelance photographer in Long Island, N.Y. After Herrmann was caught, the FBI said, he became a double agent, providing valuable information about Soviet espionage techniques and about another KGB spy. Because of his help, Herrmann will be allowed to remain in the U.S., free from prosecution.

Earlier, the Central Intelligence Agency released a report detailing how, even during the heyday of détente, the Soviet Union used forged State Department and Pentagon documents in a massive effort to alienate America from Egypt, Greece and oth-

er countries. The KGB was accused of playing a leading role in this international deception.

No nation is openly linking moves against Soviet spies directly to the attack on Afghanistan. But diplomatic and intelligence sources say the rash of action is far from coincidental.

Russian espionage has been flagrant in many capitals since World War II, yet relatively few agents have been nabbed for cloak-and-dagger work. Diplomacy is one reason. In a time of détente, some governments have ignored espionage rather than risk offending the Kremlin with a crackdown. The Af-




lomats in Switzerland actually are spying for either the KGB or for Russia's military-intelligence agency.

But Swiss officials prefer to keep a close eye on Russians identified as

spies rather than to expel them. They cite a practical reason: Any agents ordered out of the country would quickly be replaced by new operators unknown to Switzerland's antispies unit.

"I think it is fair to say that most governments around the world now are a little more suspicious of the Soviets and probably prepared to be a little tougher," says Malcolm Toon, former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union. "In



With his present appearance obscured by a screen, Col. Rudolph Herrmann tells reporters how he became a double agent and gave the FBI information about Soviet espionage.



ghan invasion appears, however, to have changed radically the political climate in which Russian spies operate. Governments seem more willing to bruise Moscow's feelings by putting a stop to Soviet espionage.

In at least one recent case, officials had hard evidence against a Russian spy long before they actually moved to expel the agent. In another episode, authorities were aware of an agent's clandestine efforts for a full two years before finally confronting him.

Even the fervently neutral Swiss are taking a harder line toward the Soviet Union. For the first time, the Swiss government recently made public the approximate number of Russian spies working in the country. It estimated that at least 200 of the 650 Soviet dip-

the past, some countries have handled this sort of thing quietly, or overlooked it in the interest of maintaining good relations."

A case in point is Japan, which has a reputation for being notoriously lax about foreign espionage within its borders. Not only does Japan lack tough antiespionage laws, but its self-defense forces have no authority to root out spying within their own ranks. This has made Japan a safe spy center for all of Asia, especially since relations between China and Russia have deteriorated.

Yet Tokyo's Metropolitan Police Force announced in mid-January that it had cracked a spy ring involving two Russian Embassy officials and three Japanese military-intelligence officers. Biggest of its type since World War II,

the case has stirred a major scandal within the government, and 11 Japanese officials stand to be disciplined before it is all over.

Police say the Japanese trio, led by the onetime boss of Army intelligence, passed military secrets to the Russians over a 10-year period. Some secrets involved information the U.S. gave Japan under a mutual-security treaty.

Subordinates used. According to police, former Maj. Gen. Yukihisa Miyana, 58, began turning classified information over to the Russians in 1970. He retired as Army intelligence chief in 1975 but is accused of continuing to acquire information by enlisting the help of two former underlings at the agency. It is the first spy case to involve a senior Japanese military officer.

Col. Yuri N. Kozolov, military attaché at the Russian Embassy in Tokyo, fled rather than submit to questioning. Also implicated was Kozolov's embassy predecessor, who left Japan in 1978.

Two other Soviet military attachés and an embassy chauffeur, were expelled from Canada last January for spy activity directed at the United States.

Canadian authorities said that, over a 16-month period, Russia had handed over at least \$10,000 to an unnamed American citizen in exchange for classified information about U.S. defense plans. Still unidentified, the American was believed to be an employee of a major U.S. defense contractor.

The incident prompted Moscow to kick a Canadian defense attaché out of Russia. Canada retaliated promptly by ousting a fourth Russian from Ottawa.

According to a Canadian minister,

the affair has chilled relations with the Soviet Union, which was accused of violating basic standards of diplomatic behavior. Just two years ago, the Canadians expelled 13 other Soviet officials for espionage and warned Moscow against a recurrence.

The French also are turning up the heat on an estimated 600 Soviet spies in that country. A Soviet consul in Marseilles was forced to leave France in February after he was caught with top-secret plans for the supersonic Mirage 2000 jet fighter, which is being tested at an air base near Marseilles.

The envoy, Guenadi Travkov, apparently tipped his hand when he tried to strike up a friendship with a French Air Force officer at a party. The officer reported the attempt, and Travkov was kept under surveillance for two years. Making the case all the more notable is the fact that France rarely publicizes such incidents, preferring instead to cloak them in diplomatic silence.

The French counterespionage office believes that a third of the nearly 1,800 Russians living in France are active Soviet spies, many of them ordered to gather data on breakthroughs with lasers, computers and jet engines.

New Zealand expelled the Soviet ambassador on 72-hour notice in late January, accusing him of secretly giving funds to the pro-Moscow Socialist Unity Party. Prime Minister Robert Muldoon is said to have had the evidence in hand for some time, but he delayed action until the United Nations condemned the Afghan invasion.

New Zealand authorities were long aware that Ambassador Vsevolod So-

finsky had a history of involvement in KGB operations while serving at the Soviet Embassy in London in the 1960s.

Bid farewell. Two more Russians were forced out in February by Spain, which resumed normal diplomatic relations with Moscow only three years ago. Officials said Oleg Shuranov, Madrid manager of the Soviet airline Aeroflot, was caught with documents that could compromise Spanish security. One day later, a high-ranking commercial attaché at the Soviet Embassy in Madrid—Anatoly Krasilnikov—was quietly "invited" to leave the country.

Intelligence sources predict that other Russians may also be forced to leave Spain in the next few months as Madrid intensifies a campaign against violence by Basque separatists. The Soviets are said to be major supporters of left-wing extremist groups in Spain, particularly those involving dissident Basques.


In West Germany, as many as 30,000 spies are presumed to be on the payroll of Russia and other Eastern European nations. Fewer than 50 a year are caught, making the country a prime hunting ground for undercover agents.

Also reported is a surge of Soviet spy activity in Italy, a key Mediterranean member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Russians recently moved into a new consulate building in Milan with space for 75 officers—more than double the number now there. Of the 30 Russians already in Milan, fewer than a dozen have identifiable consulate jobs. The rest are believed to be in the spy business.

Soviet spies are presumed to be more active in Italy these days because of the country's technological advances in recent years. The Soviet Union lags behind many industrialized nations in computer and electronics know-how.

Experts believe several hundred other Soviet operatives are in Asia, keeping track of the military capability of China and U.S. allies in the area. At least 20 Russian officials are attached to a Soviet trade mission in Bangkok, a suspiciously large number considering the small amount of commerce between Thailand and the U.S.S.R.

Thus, the recent cases of exposed undercover Russian agents may be only the tip of the espionage iceberg. All signs indicate that Moscow continues to step up spy activities. □



France kicked out a Russian envoy after catching him with documents concerning the new Mirage 2000 jet fighter. Other Soviet espionage targets: Computer and laser technology.

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ON PAGE A-22

NEW YORK TIMES
16 MARCH 1980

URANIUM LOSS IS TIED TO FEDERAL LAXITY

Nuclear Agency Report Criticizes
A.E.C. in '60's Disappearance
From Pennsylvania Plant

By DAVID BURNHAM
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 15 — The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in a new report on an old mystery, has concluded that the Federal Government permitted a nuclear fuel plant to continue operating even though it knew that the plant's system for preventing the loss of highly enriched uranium was inadequate.

A few months after the 1964 decision to allow the Pennsylvania plant to continue processing nuclear fuel, Government inspectors discovered that the facility was unable to account for about 200 pounds of highly enriched uranium, enough to make five to 10 atomic bombs.

The question of what happened at the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation in the mid-1960's has been a subject of more than a half dozen investigations and still is a matter of controversy. Though the Government for many years publicly insisted that there was no evidence that the uranium had been stolen, the commission in 1978 informed a House subcommittee that there were "many people familiar with this subject who seriously suggest a diversion occurred and they have arguments that do have substance."

The commission study of security measures in place at the Pennsylvania plant in the mid-1960's, both physical measures to guard the facility and accounting procedures to keep track of the highly enriched uranium, was undertaken at the request of Representative Morris K. Udall, Democrat of Arizona.

Fear of Other Diversions

Mr. Udall, the chairman of the House Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, has contended that the apparent failure of the Government to come to grips with the mystery at the Nuclear Materials plant in Apollo, Pa., 15 years ago, has important implications for the Government's current efforts to prevent dangerous nuclear materials from falling into the hands of another nation or a terrorist group that could use them to fashion atomic bombs.

Just two months ago, for example, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission authorized another nuclear facility, this one in Erwin, Tenn., to resume manufacturing fuel for the Navy's atomic powered ships even though the plant was unable to account for enough highly enriched uranium to make at least one bomb. The precise amount of missing uranium is classified.

The commission study said that Government documents of the period showed that the Atomic Energy Commission, the agency then responsible for protecting nuclear materials, considered the Pennsylvania plant's material control and accounting procedures "to be in noncompliance with 1964 requirements and standards."

Nevertheless, the report said, the A.E.C. did not order the Pennsylvania plant to cease operation. "Indeed," the report said, "after indicating in February and September of 1964 that material control and accounting practices might not be adequate, the A.E.C. permitted a six-month delay in conducting a complete accountability survey."

Investigation in 1965

It was the latter survey, undertaken in 1965, that discovered the large amount of uranium that could not be accounted.

The commission study said that in the staff judgment the safeguards employed at the Pennsylvania plant in the mid-1960's "were woefully inadequate" in relation to the greatly strengthened security requirements currently in effect.

The commission report said it had found 45 deficiencies in the physical protection program and 39 deficiencies in the material accounting program at the Pennsylvania plant that could have enabled "a knowledgeable insider or an outside group with the assistance of an insider" to have secretly removed "significant quantities of highly enriched uranium."

The report added that the investigation had not developed information that such a theft "did or did not occur, only that the system would not have been able to detect a theft."

Intelligence Agency Hints

There are a number of indications, however, that the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency became convinced in the late 1960's that the missing uranium somehow had been spirited to Israel. After a C.I.A. briefing about this case in 1976, for example, Peter Strauss, at that time the nuclear commission's general counsel, said that commission officials had left the strong impression that the inventory discrepancy "at the Pennsylvania plant represented material taken to Israel."

The Pennsylvania plant was established in 1957 by Dr. Zalman M. Shapiro to chemically process one form of highly enriched uranium so that it could be used for fueling Navy reactors and, for a time, an experimental nuclear rocket. Abraham Krash, Dr. Shapiro's present lawyer, said the founder and former president of the company would have no comment on the commission report.

In 1977, however, Harold Ungar, another Washington lawyer who was then representing Dr. Shapiro, said that his client's position "is very simple: he never diverted a single microgram of nuclear material to Israel or anyone else and does not believe that anyone else did so at the plant." In a separate interview, Dr. Shapiro said two years ago that he felt the missing uranium had been lost in the plant's complex manufacturing process.

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ON PAGE C 23

THE WASHINGTON POST
17 March 1980

JACK ANDERSON

Kennedy Probe—While its Abscam and Brilab scandals have been making headlines, the FBI is quietly digging into another explosive assignment—the assassination of President Kennedy.

The House Assassinations Committee turned over to the bureau its findings that Kennedy was probably killed as the result of a conspiracy, contrary to the conclusion of the Warren Commission 16 years ago.

FBI agents have been talking to former committee aides, seeking guidance for use of the committee files in the National Archives. Agents have also asked the authors of some of the committee studies for the location of documents cited in footnotes.

And the bureau has consulted the Central Intelligence Agency on ways of retesting the controversial acoustical evidence suggesting that a fourth shot was fired at Kennedy that day in Dallas.

EXCERPTED

JACK ANDERSON

U.S. Steps Up Cuba Surveillance

The uproar over the Soviet "combat brigade" in Cuba last fall has been supplanted in the headlines by Iran and Afghanistan, but the short-lived Cuban crisis brought a dramatic reordering of priorities in the U.S. intelligence community.

Cuba has now replaced China as the target of our second most intensive intelligence efforts—second only to the Soviet Union. From the status of "low priority attention," the Marxist-ruled island 90 miles off the Florida coast has risen in the intelligence community's estimation as an area worthy of concentrated and massive surveillance.

"If a rabbit moves on that place, we know about it." So a Central Intelligence Agency source described the new emphasis on Cuba to my associate Dale Van Atta. While this sounds like hyperbole, it's not all that farfetched: The satellites that have been committed to spying on Cuba since the Soviet brigade fiasco can take clear pictures of a one-foot object from 100 miles up in the stratosphere.

The administration is clearly not going to be caught napping on Cuban developments again. Briefings by the CIA are made on an almost everyday basis. As a CIA source put it, "Cuba gets an intelligence enema every three days."

A series of "Top Secret Umbra" reports from the summer of 1979 to February 1980 shows the detail with which U.S. intelligence agencies have been alerting the administration to the dangers from Russia's Caribbean colony. Much of the information focuses on Cienfuegos, on the southern coast of Cuba, where Fidel Castro has been

modernizing a key naval and air base.

- A 1979 Defense Intelligence Agency report predicts that the Russians may send a detachment of Backfire nuclear bombers into Cuba in 1980. Runways at the Cienfuegos airfield are being lengthened to 9,000 feet—the distance required for the Backfire—and there are already two airfields in Cuba that could handle the Soviet plane.

From bases in Cuba, Soviet Backfires could hit virtually any target in the United States. What alarms our military experts is that present defenses against bomber raids are aimed toward the north (against Soviet missiles coming over the North Pole) and on each seacoast (against submarine-launched missiles), leaving the nation's southeastern defenses relatively naked.

- Spy satellites have spotted a suspicious-looking building at Punta Movida, near Cienfuegos. It closely resembles the kind of structure used in Eastern Europe for storage and maintenance of nuclear missiles. Punta Movida is also being connected by a railroad, which raises the possibility that nuclear submarines could be serviced at the huge shed.

Some intelligence analysts, however, have cautioned that everything turned up by the spies-in-the-sky is consistent with a nuclear power plant the Cubans are building with Soviet help in the Cienfuegos area. And these experts note that there have been "no indications that Havana has plans for nuclear weapons."

On the other hand, some intelligence reports express concern that the CIA may be ignoring evidence

that Castro plans to use the Soviet-sponsored nuclear technology for military purposes.

- The secret intelligence reports show that the Russians have been upgrading their communications equipment in Cuba in recent years. One communications satellite facility, according to a "Top Secret Umbra" National Security Agency report, permits nearly simultaneous two-way exchanges between Havana and the Soviet defense ministry's main intelligence office. According to the report: "Havana serves as a communications relay center for the [Kremlin] to support its intelligence operations throughout the Western Hemisphere."

The intelligence reports indicate that the Soviets may not have yet breached the secret agreements they signed with the United States following the Cuban military crisis in 1962—but they're coming dangerously close.

DAILY NEBRASKAN
University of Nebraska
12 March 1980

Too many informed people sap CIA effectiveness

With President Carter's State of the Union message came the request for "a clear and quick passage of a new CIA charter." What better time than the present to revive a vital agency which has been neglected since 1974?

This isn't to say that the CIA shouldn't be held accountable for its actions, but covert operations seem highly unlikely when the details of such actions must be passed among eight Congressional committees.

How much security is ensured with more than 200 Congressmen and 40 staff members in on CIA actions?

It's difficult to determine the setbacks of weakened intelligence efforts until they are compared to something as powerful as Russia's KGB. With as much power as all of our enforcement agencies rolled into one, the KGB gets its orders from the Kremlin and executes them as it pleases at home and abroad.

The CIA shouldn't be allowed as much freedom as the KGB, but it would seem that two congressional committees and the President of the United States would be able to properly oversee intelligence efforts.

The attacks of the 1970s on our intelligence agency have not only destroyed CIA morale and its ability to gather information, but also our credibility with friendly intelligence agencies that are afraid eight committees will leak vital information.

Oppressed countries that depend upon our CIA for continued support, such as Afghanistan and Ethiopia, can't understand why they aren't getting more help from the West.

As Ethiopian guerrilla leader Hussein Mohamed Nur recently told a U.S. News and World Report reporter, "All we need is antitank weapons, artillery and medicine, and we will drive out the Russians and Cubans. But even if we don't get help, we will continue to fight, and eventually we will win."

From an idealistic viewpoint, it would be nice if we didn't have to rely on the CIA to help other countries defend themselves from communist aggression. But the recent invasion of Afghanistan should provide an important lesson—deal with the world as it is and not as we'd like it to be.

It is good to see that the statue in front of CIA headquarters near Washington—Nathan Hale, who was hanged after he was caught behind British lines disguised as a Dutch schoolteacher—won't continue to tarnish from CIA neglect.

Perhaps the days will return when ethical espionage for one's country was considered a service rather than a detriment.

Harry Allen Strunk



ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 37THE ECONOMIST
15 MARCH 1980BRITAIN
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

Open secrets

Free societies as well as closed ones need to have secret services; otherwise the closed ones will take them over. This article describes what clandestine services can and cannot do. It contrasts the American with the British system for keeping them under control. The author, M. R. D. Foot, was an army intelligence officer in the second world war and has been professor of modern history at Manchester. His books include "SOE in France" "Resistance", "Six Faces of Courage", and (with J. M. Langley) "MI9".

It is disconcerting, of course, to find that the Russians who had penetrated MI6 (the secret intelligence service) through Philby had also penetrated MI5 (the security service) through Blunt. Yet — more disconcerting still? — everybody on the inside track has known all about it for years. Interest in this sort of scandal is perennial. Its importance is an indicator to much wider questions of security control.

The unfortunate future professor decided to change his allegiance because like many of his intelligent contemporaries he could see that the existing system was rotten, and efficient propaganda kept him from appreciating that the Soviet system was more rotten still. When he made his decision, two thirds of the world's present population had not been born, and well over half his own life was yet to run. The secret services became aware of his role since 1964 when he confessed, if not in 1951 when Burgess and Maclean bolted with Blunt's and Philby's help. No amount of nosier-than-thou probing into Professor Blunt's past by scribes or telecasters is likely now to help with the problem that deserves study: can this sort of thing be stopped from happening again, and if so how? How ought secret services to be controlled in a free society?

Radicals and idealists maintain that they should be abolished: a splendid dream. Here and now they are as necessary a fact of political as clothes are of social life. Without them great (and less great) powers lie dangerously wide open to their enemies and are little use to their friends.


The spy is dead

The spy of romantic fiction — always some way from the fact, as Somerset Maugham tried to show in "Ashenden" from his own adventures in MI6 — has lately become more fictional than ever. Most of a

spy's work now gets done by photography or by radio intercept. The craft has become so esoteric, as earth satellites and microelectronics have developed, that only a handful even of its own practitioners can understand it — and as usual with anything that matters those who know won't say. At the end of the last Arab-Israeli war the Americans and the Russians both knew, and both published, exactly where each side's troops had got to, because their satellites showed them. It is said that the Pentagon and the Kremlin can now review each others' car parking patterns several times a day.

Other signs of what is going on come from signals intelligence (sigint), eavesdropping on radio traffic. Had the Admiralty and the Grand Fleet paid more attention to sigint on May 31, 1916, Jutland might have been a more conclusive victory; had Rundstedt not imposed rigorous wireless silence, he would never have achieved the surprise he did in the Ardennes in December, 1944; and those on the inside track no doubt know of much more modern examples, for instance from the Cuban crisis of 1962. How many people making any telephone call from London, or holding a confidential talk in, say, the Ritz Hotel in Piccadilly, appreciate that either the Russian or British secret service, or both, may be listening to every word they say? Even the British army, it became known last summer, forgot that the republican Irish can read whatever passes through the English post, a trick learned from the great Michael Collins: an over-zealous ordnance magnate posted 50 duplicated copies of a secret memorandum to his subordinates, and was astonished when the IRA published it.

Satellites, sigint and seismographs between them can cope with most of the routine discovery of what is going on in the world outside the territory of the government that can afford to run them (they are horribly expensive). Ad hoc



Exposed: Philby (top), Penkovsky (bottom)

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M. R. D. Foot

photographic reconnaissance by aircraft is sometimes needed as well, to supplement the information they bring in; hence the Americans' U-2s. (What do the Russians use? And why has the answer to this obvious question been hushed up?) Much time and trouble must go also into jamming and counter-jamming of radar and other types of service signals equipment, and for this again first-class intelligence about actual or potential enemies is essential, as it is for success in any form of war. This form of electrical intelligence can be called *elint* for short.

Elint might be one of the fields in which there remained a task for the conventional spy, whose job it would be to get at potential opponents' jamming plans, things once perfected hardly to be found outside a safe. The ideal spy can hardly ever exist in reality. He or she dwells, hugging a private secret of allegiance, in the inmost circles of the enemy's court, knows future plans in detail, and can transmit them safely to the other side in time for them to be counteracted. Two or three times in a blue moon such a person appears. Kim Philby, whom the Russians planted in the bosom of MI6, is the best known modern example but there have been others, not all on the wrong side: remember Penkovsky.

The fundamental rule, the fewer people who know a secret the better, is coming to take on a proverbial form: three can keep a secret if two of them are dead. Yet in an age of technology the day of the lone operator is past. Even a Philby needed a recruiter to bring him into the Soviet orbit and a courier to empty his dead-letter-boxes—or did he use live ones? Ever since he went over

physically to the Russians in 1963 he has, naturally enough, kept silent in public about how he passed over the information he acquired. His masters in the Kremlin will have told him to keep their methods secret, for communications normally provide the weakest link in any clandestine chain.

Messengers may be delayed or intercepted; messages, even in cipher, may be unravelled. All through Hitler's war the Germans and the Japanese relied on cipher machines for their most secret urgent messages, and never knew that the British and the Americans were reading them. How well the Russians did, or do, in this deadly secret field is not public knowledge, but there is no reason to suppose them to lag far behind. Certainly they have imported a lot of computer techniques from the Americans; computers are indispensable for modern deciphering. Indeed, without the world's first electronic computer, built by GPO engineers at Bletchley Park in wartime, the British could never have kept abreast of the Germans' incessant modifications to their Enigma cipher machines.

Computers can help too with the drudgery that is a main part of any intelligence officer's life. Much time goes into reducing a myriad of facts into comprehensible order, and picking out the essential fragments on which somebody has to act at once. As Namier said in another context, "a great many profound secrets are somewhere in print"; and atlases, patents, advertisement columns, company reports, sales catalogues and newspaper articles can all provide grist for the intelligence mill.

The task of intelligence-gathering is multiple, not simple. The first need is to discover information, the next to transmit it securely for appraisal and collation with what is already known. The last, sometimes the hardest, task is to get it understood and used. Military commanders, unless monsters of conceit, do not as a rule make trouble, once they have taken in the value of what their staff can lay before them. Politicians and civil servants can be more difficult. People brought up on Disraeli's "only final political principle, that the Party must on no account be broken up" (the gibe was Lord Salisbury's) are often unwilling to take political risks, or risks of any kind. If a civil service makes a habit of promoting people primarily because they are safe men who will not rock the boat, it may one day ruin its country by promoting to the top someone who is pusillanimous at heart, and shrinks from action in a crisis where inaction is fatal. Are martial qualities really necessary in a chief or permanent secretary in a time of nominal peace? Emphatically yes: the peace is

only nominal. War is war, whether declared or not.

Long live the spy

The basic trouble is that though war is in progress—in Ireland, in Zimbabwe, in Kurdistan, in Afghanistan, in Kampuchea, in and around Israel, wherever people are killing other people for public rather than for private motives—there is little public awareness of the fact of war, outside the immediately threatened areas and families. Not many people thought till last August that Sligo Bay was under threat, any more than John or Robert Kennedy knew on the morning of his death that he had shaved for the last time. Menace can arrive as swiftly as the proverbial bolt from the blue; secret services need constantly to watch for it.

The division of responsibilities between an intelligence service like MI6 and a security service like MI5 is not at all clear-cut. There is all too much scope for interservice rivalry and jealousy, and if one tries to avoid this by putting both under the same head, that head is bound to be an over-mighty subject. Neither Himmler nor Yezhov, those ogres of the 1930s, are now much admired by the sane. Liaison, even the interchange of officers, between intelligence and security services are necessary and important. The British once, in the 1960s, moved Sir Dick White the chief of one to head the other, with great benefit. There is likely still to remain a grey area of overlap: which of the two, for example, ought to keep an eye at present on visiting Iraqi subversives in British and American universities? Relations with the police may be awkward too. The police like to deal with facts, actualities, physical incidents, property. Security officers are more concerned with potentialities, probabilities, ideas, and dare not be conformist stick-in-the-muds. "Nothing must ever be done for the first time", the slogan of F. M. Cornford's Non Placet Society at Cambridge long ago, is a cry of doom.

Against whom does a security service need to work? It is important to distinguish the dyed-in-the-wool baddies, outright terrorists and clandestine card-carrying members of secret branches of communist parties, from their conscious and unconscious fellow-travellers. Many of the baddies are able and devoted men and women, raised by their ability to posts that matter, and capable through their devotion of doing a great deal of harm. They may do it suddenly in a single spectacular coup; for which they run an appreciable risk of being caught, or they may do it stealthily, month by month, year by year, decade by decade. They are both dangerous and exceedingly hard to

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One of the victims of terrorism

catch. The fellow-travellers are more easy to spot. Some are mere mischief-makers, some are stupid; some know what they are doing, some do not. In any case, whoever pursues them must work on a snaffle, not a curb: tight control from above is bound to be counter-productive.

A security service's front task is to be alert to the visible potential agents of foreign powers, service attachés in embassies, indeed the entire staff working under diplomatic cover however lowly, and all visiting delegations—trade, cultural or sport. To watch everybody in these categories is impossible, in terms of sheer manpower, except in a tyranny. The Russians, who take security very seriously indeed because they regard themselves as at war with most of the rest of the world, maintain the staff to mount a watch on most foreigners who might menace them. The price they pay is too high for western tastes: a secret police force so vast that it has become one of the principal organs of state. (One of its heads, Beria, who did not long outlive his master Stalin, was shot on the charge that he was a British agent. Not a shred of evidence appeared, but it was a curious back-handed compliment to MI6.)

Behind this obvious, public, self-proclaimed group of difficult characters comes an awkward class of invisible imports: the undercover people, moles whether active or sleepers. Sleepers maintain an impeccable front, as managers, journalists, salesmen, members of parliament and so on, till they get a code message to become active, whereupon they start work. Against them only luck

and vigilance offer much hope of success.

Next comes a large, loose category: unconscious fellow-travellers, people who do an enemy's work for him without realising it. They are found in all sorts of walks of life, perhaps clustering the thickest among trade union organisers, journalists and teachers. Many do not see beyond the end of their own political noses, and having learned from Sir Harold Wilson that "a week is a long time in politics" never think of next month, let alone next century, while the world communist movement, like the Vatican, thinks by millennia.

There are also those naturally combative people, Marxists following Groucho rather than Karl, who say with their inspirer "Whatever it is, I'm against it." They enjoy making a row, and—no doubt as the result of an unfortunate childhood—dislike authority intensely. Members of this group will be familiar to most readers, but they do not yet seem to have been given a collective name; below they will be called the shrillies. They are noisy but seldom really harmful.

Sudden death

The remaining group that must be watched is far the deadliest: the terrorists. At the moment, as 1979's assassinations and the prospect of 1980's make clear, they are the world's worst problem; until they are tidied up, there is no kind of certainty that anything worth doing can be done. While their menace exists, security is bound to outweigh espionage in the clandestine budget of all but the superpowers.

Yet how does one get a grip on this slimy monster? All extremists tend to disagree with one another, and terrorists' politics are as fissiparous as Italians' or Indians'. There are nevertheless enough perceptible strands of common aim and common tactics for commonsense to approve the concept of a world terrorist movement, unstably Marxist in doctrine, bitterly anti-Jewish (odd, when so many of Lenin's most useful followers in the crisis of 1917 were Jews) and hostile to the non-Marxist rich. To what extent, if any, it comes under the Kremlin's control is unclear; even the Kremlin was shocked at Mountbatten's murder (might this be an early sign of a split between the governing party and the secret police?). Terrorists do not at present operate in Russia, one of the few advantages of living under a tyranny: security is altogether too tight.

Modern terrorists like all extremist groups prefer to recruit among the young and earnest. They seek for people who will happily slit their grandmothers' throats if doing so will forward the Cause. Luckily there is some shortage of plausible Causes. No one is likely to slit Granny's throat to keep Brezhnev and his ailing elderly colleagues in the affluence to which they have become accustomed. A system that could swallow the camel of an alliance with Hitler did not strain at the gnat of backing Idi Amin; how can it deserve enthusiastic support? Still, even a little support from terrorists is not negligible, considering the firepower one squad, even one lone bomber, can now command. Sound intelligence—some of it from unpopular forms of sigint, telephone tapping and bugging of meetings—is indispensable against them. Transit controls are helpful also, but too many of them make a tyranny: where best to draw the line? A few more controls would certainly do no harm in Northern Ireland; where the standing dispute in history next most ancient to the quarrel between Arab and Jew is passing through one of its many acute stages. To have only 20 control points among some 400 motorable crossings into the Irish Republic is a nonsense. More important, as *The Economist* put it last September:

Absolute co-operation against terrorism between police forces and intelligence forces is soon going to be essential among all civilised countries, although politicians hunting for ethnic votes do not understand this.

The alternative, as terrorists eventually turn nuclear, is going to be to see the world blown up.

It is always difficult to separate out one branch of clandestine work from another. Counter-intelligence, broadly regarded, is not the same as security. It includes the highly technical field of counter-espio-

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nage—the infiltration of enemy spy-rings with one's own side's people, a subject in which only the most foolish amateurs would wish to dabble while it is going on, though it is fair game for the historian.

Other forms of deception come under counter-intelligence: also. It involves spreading abroad inflated ideas of one's own country's strength and capacities, of the omniscience of its staffs and the ubiquity of its agents. The Russians have long been past masters at this difficult art: witness the credulous millions who still believe the Red Army was of military importance at the time of the Munich crisis of 1938. The crisis came at the depth of Yezhov's great purge, which arrested everyone in the Russian armed forces of the rank of major and above except Stalin and his brother-in-law.

Countries living on their wits, as the British have so often lately had to do, may not have many real resources left, but efficient counter-intelligence can cover up for a good deal. Few English journalists remember that willy-nilly, consciously or unconsciously, they act as counter-intelligence agents, because they help to mould the world's opinion of their country. Few Russian journalists forget it, and those of them who work abroad do so aware that they are working, directly or indirectly, for the KGB.

Accidents can be helped to happen

A further field of secret activity is open: sabotage. Nobody in the west at present dares tread in it, in apparent peacetime, though several powers attempted it during the last two world wars, and both the Russians and the Cubans continue to train agents in it. Should counter-intelligence move over from propaganda to more active subversion, including sabotage? Modern industry and communications are extremely vulnerable. Many years' work in assembling data for a computer can be annihilated in five minutes by anyone with inside knowledge and a strong magnet. Thousands of complicated manufacturing processes can be brought to a standstill by very slight interference, sometimes accidental; accidents can be helped to happen. With any luck for a saboteur, the responsibility for what went wrong will be quite untraceable, or traced to an innocent person, or simply blamed on the system; with the North Thames Gas Board, what need has London for foreign saboteurs? States with open societies hold at present to a sort of golden rule of international politics—do as you would be done by—and do not attempt this sort of coup. Are they always right to do so?

Secret committee from the Raj

There is a marked divergence between the American and the British treatment of the intelligence services. All practitioners in these fields take for granted—probably rightly—that they have to operate in secret, and everywhere outside the United States such subjects are wrapped in dense security veils. The veils are particularly dense in London because it used to be an imperial capital.

They derive from the mystique of the Raj, that astounding feat of political legerdemain by which a few thousand Sahibs controlled for a century a sub-continent populated by many scores of millions of Asiatics. MI5 and MI6, the British security and intelligence services, were heavily penetrated by members of the old Indian police services, who brought with them habits of never discussing certain subjects in front of the natives that have been out of date since 1947.

If an MP tries to inquire in parliament who the current heads of security and intelligence services are, he will be told that it is not in the public interest that he should receive a reply. Indeed government does its best to continue with the pretence, long threadbare, that no such body as the intelligence service exists: a nicety of diplomatic manners for which any real use is no longer easy to perceive. Those who want to know need to read *Private Eye* carefully; in this field it is seldom inaccurate or out of date. The New Statesman recently named Sir Howard Trayton Smith as the head of MI5 and Sir Arthur Franks as head of MI6.

Constitutional theory, behind the pretence that nothing is happening at all, is that both the secret intelligence service and the security service come nominally under the ministry of defence, while the foreign secretary is actually responsible for intelligence and the home secretary for security.

Convention allows the head of either secret service direct access to the prime minister if need be. Not much notice need any longer be taken of the role of the crown, important in the second half of Victoria's reign when almost all but the grandest ruling houses of Europe were related to her, and her correspondence with her connections could have great political import.

The secretary to the British cabinet—the person who really runs the country, on all matters of detail—must have to add awareness of what the British secret services are doing to an already enormous workload. The imposing silence of Lord Trend provided one of the most fascinat-

ing aspects of the Blunt tragicomedy, and was a model of all a perfectly secure former public servant ought to do. But the secretary to the cabinet, though he has to bear the main burden of the workload, cannot undertake the responsibility.

Ultimate responsibility must be the prime minister's, but she or he will have neither time nor capacity for details. Churchill, working at white heat on first taking over in May, 1940, and haunted by ghosts of secret errors in the past, demanded that secret reports should be laid before him in their original, undoctored form. He rapidly found that he could not understand them, and went back to having them processed for him by a specialist secretary who could. For Mrs Thatcher, 40 years on, the content will have become no more easy to master.

She shares the responsibility with a cabinet committee. Several senior ministers need to be aware of any secret operation of importance, and only an excessively rash head of MI5 or MI6 would contemplate mounting one without prior political approval. The full cabinet, though all have taken the privy councillor's oath, is far too large for secrecy. The home, foreign, defence, and Northern Ireland secretaries, under the prime minister, form this committee. Each of them can feel glad that the burden of approval or disapproval is not one that has to be carried entirely alone. Collectively they make a formidable bunch of five. The heads of the secret services attend the committee meetings if required.

This is not the sort of meeting of which the minutes are likely to be available to unofficial historians at all soon, if ever. A disagreeable side effect of the secrecy in which the whole subject is shrouded lies in the innumerable opportunities provided for scandal-mongers and trouble-makers, for snide innuendo and waspish smear. This often plays straight into enemy hands.

The passion for secrecy is sometimes so intense that it inhibits action of any kind, in any direction—even to save money. The secret services were left out of the latest round of government spending cuts. Ostensible spending on them is to rise from £36m to £40m this year, but that only just about keeps up with inflation. The actual figure, hidden here and there in various estimates, is very much larger, over £250m.

The trouble about the British control system is that it is so largely out of the public's, even out of parliament's, reach. It does not satisfy the reasonable demand that there should be some degree of public accountability for matters on which the fate of the nation hangs. No

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
doubt telephone intercepts form a vital kind of security against spies, terrorists, milder subversives and plain criminals alike. But to whom do the hundreds of interceptors answer? To whom are they responsible? Who ensures that they do not use the knowledge they obtain by intercept to further their own interests—or, indeed, feather their own nests?

Three further sorts of difficulty arise: over class, money and politics. It is a defect in the secret services that, for excellent reasons, they have recruited largely from the less exalted reaches of the old governing class. It has always been thought suitable, when looking for people to fill what the foreign office calls "sensitive" postings, to recruit from families already known to be sound and sturdy (a country that spends so large a proportion of its wages on betting on horses cannot be entirely indifferent to breeding). People currently senior in the secret services may therefore be in danger of misunderstandings when they have to talk to senior politicians from quite different class allegiances, while people deliberately brought into the secret world from proletarian origins may be in just as much trouble on this front as are Rugbeians or Haileyburians. Self-perpetuating oligarchies are seldom a success, *pace* the Roman Curia and the Russian general staff.

As for money, the head of each British secret service has to satisfy the controller and auditor-general, in person, that the money allocated to his service has been properly spent to the public benefit; one civil servant has to reassure another, but parliament has no say. On the political front, MPs who are worried about any aspect of the secret world have to fall back not on what they know but on whom they know, and this may fail them. Even at ministerial level, the politician's central question, "What is there in this for my party, or indeed for me?" should never occur to the secret services, whose staffs should ask only, "Where in this tangle lies the solution best for the country's interest?" Compromise-addicted politicians cannot always be made to see that in some narrow political passes the national interest allows no room for compromise at all.

The admiral and the judge

This last point applies equally in the United States, where by contrast everything is, or is supposed to be, public and above-board. The heads of the two main services, Admiral Stansfield Turner at the Central Intelligence Agency (intelligence), and Judge William Webster at



Two sides of a coin: Turner (left) and Webster (right)

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (security) are not only known, they were appointed on presidential nomination with congressional approval. Both houses of congress have set up, in addition to their committees on foreign affairs and on defence, new committees to investigate the problems of intelligence. Each committee has a director in charge of a young and vigorous staff; and these directors—Mr William Miller for the senate and Mr Thomas Latimer for the house—while much younger and less experienced than the admiral and the judge are not much less important. (Mr Miller was recently in the world's headlines; he speaks Persian and was at the elbow of one of Mr Carter's first unavailing emissaries towards Iran after the seizure of the American embassy in Teheran.)

Two other personalities in Washington are worth special mention in this connection: Mr Walter Mondale the vice-president, who served on the original strong committee under Senator Church that did the donkey-work in organising congress's hold on the CIA and the FBI in the aftermath of Watergate and Vietnam; and Senator Walter Huddleston of Kentucky, who seems next in line for the chairmanship of the senate intelligence committee if Senator Birch Bayh the current incumbent loses his seat this November.


Vice-President Mondale is at the centre of the intelligence web in Washington. He presides over the senate in which he used to sit, and is therefore well aware of what passes on Capitol Hill; he is also discreetly available to the agency heads in a way that the president who is constantly

in the public eye is not. Mr Mondale and Mr Huddleston are both shrewd and level-headed men, well accustomed to the ups and downs of public and secret politics, not liable to be swept away by newspaper or any other kind of panic: an important qualification for power.

The housing of the FBI and the CIA is as public as the supervision of them. The FBI has a new brown concrete fortress on Pennsylvania Avenue, opposite the department of justice; on fine summer days tourists picnic in the courtyard, and queue in their hundreds for guided trips round the building, just as they queue to visit the Capitol to the east or the White House to the west of it. And on the George Washington Memorial Highway, the landscaped motorway that leads from the American capital towards Dulles international airport, a large road sign as explicit as any other remarks "Central Intelligence Agency NEXT RIGHT". So public, so imposing is the marble hall at Langley, Virginia, which includes a memorial plaque to Allen Dulles, once head of CIA—brother to John Foster Dulles the secretary of state, after whom the airport is named—that a thought Americans might find impious is bound to strike the European visitor: Can this place really be the headquarters of a secret body? Is not it simply a front, maintained to mask the hard work being done by dedicated men and women elsewhere?

The constitutional position is clear: the president, and only the president, can undertake final responsibility for any executive action. He is commander-in-chief, and both the FBI and the CIA were created by presidential fiat, on a system

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Too open by half?

British administrators sometimes envy. Below the president, the controlling body is the National Security Council, on which he sits with the heads of these agencies and the secretaries of state and of defence, and anyone else whose advice he needs. It meets, in principle, in secret.

Yet since the body-blow dealt by Watergate to public confidence in the administration's integrity, there has been a sharp falling-off in public reliance on the agencies to do their job unobtrusively and fairly. None of the shrillies, or the unconscious fellow-travellers, have paused to inquire who orchestrated the press outcry against the CIA. (Have any of their English equivalents paused to consider why so many articles in the English press currently sap confidence in the police?)

The truth, by now apparent, is that the CIA and the FBI did make a number of mistakes in the past, some of them serious. All of them by now—at any rate all the important ones—have been admitted; several need never have become known, had the agencies themselves not uncovered their own misdeeds. But the hunt is now up. Whenever anything goes wrong, it is blamed on a semi-secret body, whether fairly or no. It was the CIA for instance, not the state department, that was publicly berated for having failed to foresee the fall of the Shah: not a judgment history is likely to bear out.

There are still plenty of earnest, well-intentioned men and women in the American quasi-clandestine agencies, who conceive of their task in a strictly constitutional sense, and are ready and able to work within the charters to define

each agency's task which are still under protracted debate in congress. Both the admiral and the judge positively welcome the rigid guidelines for their agencies' constitutionality that are being laid down. Their main difficulty is that the agencies have now been pitchforked into the political arena, instead of being kept as they were in (say) Truman's day, above and beyond party. On technical points Admiral Turner can still have his own way: it is the CIA for instance that decides what American satellites are to photograph; the defence department's task is simply to launch and operate them.

But in American politics, particularly with a presidential election looming (as it usually is), there are always attitudinisers, ethnicists, sectionalists, who put first the interests of themselves or of some fragments of the electoral community the wooing of which will promote their personal political fortunes. The Democratic platform of 1976 included a plank that advocated more congressional control of the agencies. Even Mr Mondale, who was elected on this platform, now that the new presidential campaign has formally opened "just feels that he has no time to focus" on this problem, and the Republicans have mounted a counter-campaign in favour of more elbow-room for the agencies to do their proper work in secret.

Mr Carter has pre-empted them, with an admirable paragraph in his recent state of the union address:

We also need quick passage of a new charter to define clearly the legal authority and accountability of our intelligence agencies. While guaranteeing that abuses will not

occur, we need to remove unwarranted restraints on our ability to collect intelligence and to tighten our controls on sensitive intelligence information. An effective intelligence capability is vital to our nation's security.

The system of open government, openly arrived at, which all Americans are brought up to revere does not fit with the necessities of clandestine warfare against a ruthless enemy bent on America's ruin.

There is, moreover, a difficulty inherent in the presidential system: what if the president is no good? A Lincoln with the strength of character to say "Ayes one, noes seven, the ayes have it" is rare; a compromiser, even a shilly-shallyer, is more likely to emerge from the rough-and-tumble of an American convention. A president of less than Lincoln-like personality may find himself taken over and run by a secretary of state or of defence, or by an agency head: what then?

There have been outstanding agency heads already—"Wild Bill" Donovan, Allen Dulles, J. Edgar Hoover, to name only the dead. These three were all in their very different ways devoted servants of the republic, and loyal to their presidents, even if Hoover reinforced himself for his 48 years in charge of the FBI—from 1924 to his death in 1972—by filing something to the discredit of everybody else in federal politics, and letting it be known that he had done so. Partly because of this taint of blackmail, Hoover has left many anecdotes but not many fragrant memories behind. He was a determined woman-hater as well as a conscious Strong Man. His agency often hogged publicity; once at least by doing so it nearly ruined a delicate and important wartime deception ploy by MI5, by trying to expose the double agent Dusko Popov, later the author of "Spy/Counter-spy". But Hoover was loyal; and a lasting after-effect of Watergate seems to be that this kind of loyalty may not get inspired anymore. How does one stop a Hoover from turning into a Himmler? A new rule lays down that nobody may head the FBI for more than 10 years, which is a start; can it possibly be enough?

Financial control is the Anglo-Saxon panacea, supposed to restrain the most obstreperous. This was how parliament tamed Charles I, why the 13 colonies broke away from George III. "No taxation without representation" has now become dogma on both sides of the Atlantic. Conversely everyone assumes that government departments are paid for out of taxes. With clandestine services this is not necessarily so. If they are any good, they certainly include skilled forg-

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ers. In the early 1940s an ingenious British printer perceived that almost all the official fonts of type used in Germany had been cast by a British firm, and was able to use the original moulds whenever he wanted to fabricate a German document. New photoprinting techniques have put that method out of court, but the principle remains; so if a clandestine service jibs at government control of its money, it can always think of printing its own. Why did those beautiful old white £5 notes disappear? Ostensibly because Jews working under SS control in Mauthausen produced almost perfect forgeries, in which that equivocal spy "Cicero" received over £250,000 for services rendered. The fact was that the American Office of Strategic Services—CIA's ancestor—could turn out exact replicas.

Distant control by congressional committees, through Mr Miller's and Mr Latimer's eager-beavers, ought to be able to ensure that the awful errors of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and other now celebrated boops, are not repeated. (The Bay of Pigs turned out long after to have been as much the fault of the Pentagon as of the CIA; no sensationalist noticed.) Can anyone, however, have much confidence in congress as a safeguard against Russia's hard-bitten professionals?

Congressional committees are notoriously leaky. Some 17,000 congressional assistants throng the hill, about half of them under the age of 30: a splendid series of openings for recent graduates in politics, law and the social sciences, and a tempting target for intelligence penetration by Cuba or Russia. So far the intelligence committees have an excellent record, but taking a line through Philip Agee, the defector from the CIA—his book on it has just been published in Russia at a rouble a copy—it is probable that before long some junior will leak something that matters. (Nobody in the CIA who knew him can forget Dick Welch, their man in Athens, assassinated as the direct result of a leak.) Among politicians in Washington and their numerous aides, leaks can be made to improve one's own or to lower one's opponent's standing, or even as a move in office rather than in national politics.

To behave in this way with intelligence material would be to play with matches in a powder-magazine. The agencies themselves are not above inspiring leaks, when they feel that doing so will strengthen their own image. But such leaks are not involuntary or, if well managed, damaging. Sometimes the agencies directors must sigh for the simplicity of life in Moscow or Havana, Prague or Peking, with a press under perfectly firm control; and then remember that perfectly firm control is just what they are fighting against.

Open and shut case

The Blunt business has reminded the British how far the long arm of the Russian secret services can reach. The Russian invasion of Afghanistan has reminded everybody that detente is now no better than a dirty word. St Paul's remark that we are all members one of another has taken on a new twist of meaning in what 40 years ago Wendell Willkie called "One World". There is nowhere so remote (think of Gan, think of the South Pole) nor so barren (think of Rockall, think of the Gobi desert) that it is not of strategic interest to somebody. No country is now so obscure that great powers dare afford to leave it quite alone (think of Laos, think of Mozambique). It is time for a fresh look at the free world's secret arrangements.

Nothing that is really secret—nothing that bears on impending operations, near or remote—needs to be made public; but there can hardly be harm in explanations, even by the British, of the general principles on which the clandestine services are run. It might make a convenient preface to such an explanation to lay down something of what is known about the clandestine services run by the world communist movement. Only a crypto or a lunatic would want to lay secret services open, in Britain or anywhere else, to complete public inspection or day-to-day control. William Colby, a straightforward ex-parachutist with legal training, very far from crypto or lunatic tendencies, on being made head of CIA tried to run it in full co-operation with congress: every single proposed move was leaked.

A few subjects are manifestly unsuitable for public inquiry at all. Let an outsider try to draw up a short list:

- Cipher and decipher.
- Jamming and counter-jamming.
- Satellite programming.
- Infiltration of other powers' ill-intentioned agencies.
- Watch on terrorists' bomb factories and gunmen's movements.
- Strategic deceptions.
- Long-term preparations for raising hell abroad, through subversion and sabotage.

The American system will clearly benefit from being less painfully open, in spite of the degree to which openness has been built into the way the Americans prefer to deal with each other. They will simply have to remember that the Russians are watching and listening in whenever they can. Whatever congress finally decides about the agencies—and it is now beginning to move having been prodded by President Carter—it must leave them in



Colby had no secrets

unfettered control at least of the subjects listed above. The best hope that the free world will remain free lies in an efficient, constitutional, freedom-loving—but adequately secret—CIA and FBI.

As for the British, necessarily now the subordinate partner, their system would benefit from being a good deal less closed. Cabinet, parliament, the armed forces and the general public alike deserve to be treated with more respect and more straightforwardness. In a true democracy there ought to be no problem of who sits above and who below the salt.

Now is the moment for the prime minister to admit the existence of a secret intelligence service. Is there any still valid reason why its head, and the head of the security service—whose identities are perfectly well known in the Kremlin—should not be officially named? Might not at least a few parliamentary privy councillors share in the comptroller and auditor-general's yearly investigation into how the two secret services spend their money? Ill-intentioned interventions by sensation-seeking MPs or journalists are of course deplorable, but would any harm be done by an occasional serious debate in parliament?

When the Blunt business broke, Mrs Thatcher showed a welcome readiness to speak out. Indeed it was her initiative in doing so that crystallised Fleet Street's suspicions into certainty—and kept the debate within bounds. Yet when a public inquiry was proposed, she and Mr Callaghan showed a suspicious unanimity in their desire to sweep the whole mess promptly back under the carpet of official secrecy. In this particular case they may have had excellent reasons which the public does not need to know. But is the ancient cry, "not in the public interest", valid any more as a stopper on all serious discussions about clandestinity? Or has it become a cloak to hide incompetence past—or present?

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ON PAGE A10

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
19 March 1980

Kuwait Hints It Would Sell Its Oil to Soviets

Washington Sees 'Foot in Door' in Gulf

By Roberta Hornig
Washington Star Staff Writer

Kuwait, a pro-Western Arab oil producer, has signaled its willingness to sell oil to the Soviet Union.

Although Moscow has yet to comment on the offer, Washington oil analysts regard the unofficial gesture as "the Soviets' potential first foot in the door" in the Persian Gulf, the lifeline of the industrialized West.

The Kuwaiti offer came from Oil Minister Sheik Ali Khalifa al-Sabah in answer to a question from a reporter traveling in the region earlier this month with French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing. The minister said then that Kuwait is prepared to sell oil to both the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies.

That reply was echoed here this week by Ambassador Khalid M. Jaffar and other embassy officials.

"We don't have any reservations concerning the Soviet Union or the Communist bloc as a whole," a Kuwaiti official said.

"What oil we have we will sell to anyone. In Kuwait we do business with both Western and Eastern countries," said Jaffar, who pointed to the oil state's first major arms purchase from the Soviet Union — sophisticated surface-to-surface missiles.

"You can't say to somebody: 'You sell me arms but I won't sell you oil,'" said Jaffar.

Jaffar also pointed to a long trading relationship with the Russians. "We've been doing business with them since 1965," he said.

Kuwait, which pumps 2.15 million barrels daily, is the fifth largest producer within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Most of Kuwait's oil goes to Japan and Western Europe. Kuwait has officially announced that beginning April 1, it will cut its production to 1.5 million barrels daily.

A Kuwaiti diplomat here said he did not "foresee that the Soviet Union needs oil soon."

But an oil analyst pointed to the first tacit acknowledgement within the Soviet Union — only a few days before the Kuwaiti offer — of Soviet interest in Persian Gulf oil.

Late last month, a Soviet Communist Party official proposed an all-European conference, including the Soviet Union, on security of oil routes from the Persian Gulf. The official also indicated publicly for the first time that Russia is "a potential buyer" of gulf oil. The proposal was circulated by the official Soviet agency, Tass.

The CIA for years has been predicting that Soviet oil production would decline and that it would have to turn to the gulf for additional supplies for the Communist bloc in the mid 1980s. The intelligence thesis is that the United States and the Soviet Union are ultimately headed to a confrontation over scarce Persian Gulf oil supplies.

Kuwait, like most Arab states, is critical of U.S. peace efforts in the Middle East, particularly the slow pace of negotiations over Palestinian autonomy.

Acknowledging that this issue has seriously eroded the credibility of the United States in the Arab world, a Kuwaiti official in effect reported that the oil state does not see much difference between "the two superpowers."

The diplomat also expressed anger at President Carter's State of the Union message to Congress when Carter declared the Persian Gulf vital to U.S. interests and warned that he is prepared to use military force to turn back a Soviet attack on the region.

CHICAGO SUN-TIMES
12 MARCH 1980

And they call it intelligence

These are hard times for intelligence, and we are not referring to most politicians' television ads. We refer to spying. Two problems:

(1) Wimex, a government super-computer that's supposed to warn the president in case of a Soviet missile attack, has bouts of neurasthenia, refusing to do anything except sit there and whir. The General Accounting Office says the system isn't just pettish; its design is fundamentally flawed. When called into action, it goes into shock.

(2) Ex-spy Philip Agee and his merry band have done it again: released another list of names and cover-names of three dozen supposed CIA agents in foreign nations, from

Bahrain to Yugoslavia. Agee & Co. say such secrets aren't secret at all. The CIA says they are, too; even if they weren't, why blab?

Through experience—painful experience—we have learned there is little to do with a computer that refuses to compute. Worse, there is nothing to do with a loudmouth who won't shut up. Fearful symmetry: Wimex swooning and hanging on to all its data, Agee lurching awake and blurting out his.

As F. Scott Fitzgerald wrote, in a different context: "The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function."

Approved For Release 2009/06/05 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501360004-6

FOIA

Approved For Release 2009/06/05 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501360004-6

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 22THE VILLAGE VOICE
17 March 1980

Sunshine Jimmy and the Cult of Darkness

By Nat Hentoff

The citizens of Chile clearly were too irresponsible to be left free. Why, Salvador Allende was about to come to power as the result of a democratic election. God knows the CIA had tried terribly hard to save these people from themselves. The Agency had secretly funded—with your tax dollars—huge propaganda campaigns in Chilean newspapers. It had paid workers to stay out on strike to further “destabilize” the situation, and it had spread bountiful anti-Allende bribes around. Nonetheless, the natives had insisted on making up their own minds.

And so, on September 15, 1970, CIA Director Richard Helms attended a meeting with President Richard Nixon, Attorney General John Mitchell, and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. The sole item on the agenda was “Track II”—the mounting of a military coup in Chile. (Not Afghanistan. Chile.) When he left, Helms quickly wrote down the essence of the Star Chamber resolution:

*1 in 10 chances perhaps, but save Chile!
worth spending
not concerned risks involved
no involvement of embassy
\$10,000,000. available, more if necessary
full-time job—best men we have—
game plan
make the economy scream
48 hours for plan of action.*

It didn't work then. Three years later, it did. Largely because of the CIA, American banks, and multinational corporations, Allende was killed, and the childishly free-thinking citizens of Chile were placed under the protectorate of a dictatorship. Many had to be murdered be-

cause of their incurable addiction to liberty, but what the hell, Chile had been saved.

This Helms document—both the handwritten original and a typewritten copy—can be found in the recently published *DOCUMENTS: A shocking collection of memoranda, letters, and telexes from the secret files of the American intelligence community*. Christy Macy and Susan Kaplan assembled and annotated the documents, and the publisher of this invaluable outsize paperback is Penguin.

The book could not have been published without the Freedom of Information Act which, as Macy and Kaplan say, “is responsible for much of what we now know about the clandestine world of the national security apparatus.”

Also in *Documents* is a draft of the anonymous (actually, FBI) letter to Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1964 urging that he commit suicide to forfend the release of tapes made from bugs planted by the FBI in his hotel rooms: “There is but one way out for you. You better take it before your filthy, abnormal fraudulent self is bared to the nation.”

That's an FBI document, but the CIA also spied on King. Not only overseas, but here. As George Lardner, Jr., has pointed out in the *Washington Post*, not a trace of the CIA's surveillance of King appeared “in the extensive congressional or executive branch investigations of the agency conducted in recent years.” But, when Harold Weisberg, a writer from Frederick, Maryland, filed a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit to get the CIA documents on King, they finally made their way—much to the discomfiture of the Agency—into the light.

There is a long list of crucially instruc-



CIA Director Stansfield Turner:
Only the Shadow knows.

tive books that could not have been written without the FOIA. One is William Shawcross's *Sideshow*. Another is John Marks's *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate: The CIA and Mind Control*, just reissued in a McGraw-Hill paperback. In 1975, Marks noticed two sentences in the Rockefeller Commission report on the CIA. They had to do with a “CIA program to study possible means for controlling human behavior” and said that some of the studies had “explored the effects of radiation, electric-shock, psychology, psychiatry, sociology, and harassment substances.”

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Marks filed a Freedom of Information Act request for all the CIA's documents on behavior control. After a protracted struggle with the Agency, he got more than enough information to write his terrifying book, which far exceeds any screenwriters' notions of how coldly destructive our secret agents can be so long as they are confident that no one outside the Agency will know about their crimes.

Yet, Jimmy Carter is leading a campaign to exempt the CIA from nearly all provisions of the Freedom of Information Act and thereby allow that agency to function freely in darkness again. Indeed, Carter has declared that he wants "relief-across-the-board" not only for the CIA but for all the intelligence agencies. This is the Carter who campaigned four years ago for openness in government; but now that he is the government, Carter has come—like his predecessors—to the conclusion that the American people, like the Chileans, cannot be trusted. Even if another subterranean CIA "Track II" gets us into World War III.

Four years ago, Carter said: "We must never again keep secret the evolution of our foreign policy from the Congress and the American people." Now, Carter and his myrmidons are pushing Congress to enact legislation that will gut the Freedom of Information Act. One of the bills, the National Intelligence Act of 1980, contains provisions (Title IV, Section 421-D) that will exempt the CIA from just about all of the Freedom of Information Act. Had this legislation been in effect, the books I have cited—and many more—could not have been written.

As John Marks says about *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*, without the 16,000 pages of documents the CIA most grudgingly released to him under the FOIA, "the best investigative reporting in the world could not have produced a book, and the secrets of CIA mind-control work would have remained buried forever, as the men who knew them had always intended."

The proposed National Intelligence Act (S. 2284)—along with other bring-back-the-darkness bills now in Congress—would legally cover up unlawful activities of the CIA. As well as other ventures, however reckless. The best reporting on this assault against the Freedom of Information Act has been by George Lardner in *The Washington Post*, and he points out that under the legislation, "Public inquiries could be rejected without any inspection of the documents sought. Lawsuits would be fruitless. The files would be immune from court action, except for individuals seeking records about themselves."

At a recent hearing in the House, Congressman Ted Weiss (Democrat of Manhattan) asked CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci if he was really urging that not even journalists should have access to past CIA files on, let us say, mind-control programs.

Rather than answering the question directly, Carlucci, like his President, asked Weiss to simply have faith in the innate ethical probity of the public servants who run the CIA: "No such experimentation will take place as long as Admiral Turner and I are in the Agency."

What else are you asking Santa for Christmas?

There is another bill insulating the CIA, and it was largely written by that very agency itself. The helpful sponsor is Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who has come to have some misgivings about parts of that measure (S. 2216), but is still staunchly behind a section that also protects the CIA from intrusive journalists and other citizens, including its domestic victims. But Moynihan's measure goes even further than the National Intelligence Act, exempting not only the CIA from most Freedom of Information Act provisions but also allowing much of the work of other intelligence agencies to remain unexamined until the world ends, one way or another.

This eagerness to bring back the night might indicate to some casual observers that our intelligence agencies have been made so porous by the Freedom of Information Act that they can barely function any longer. (Given those agencies' cumulative records, that might be a great boon for the nation.) In fact, however, as anyone who has asked for his own file knows, these agencies still have a lot of discretion as to what they choose to withhold. And the CIA, as Morton Halperin has pointed out, is free even to deny that a document exists if it believes candor "would reveal information about CIA employees, jeopardize an intelligence source or method, or reveal properly classified information."

And, if you bring the CIA to court because it has refused you certain information on national security grounds, the CIA, Halperin emphasizes, can—right now—"present arguments to the judge in secret without the opposing lawyer or client present."

Therefore, like the President's call for draft registration, the current thrust to remove Freedom of Information Act "restraints" from the CIA has no basis in reality. Democratic reality, that is. If the goal, however, is to re-establish a secret intelligence state within and outside the republic, then the various congressional bills to seal nearly all records—and immunize them from judicial review—make excellent authoritarian sense.

Actually, "re-establish" isn't quite the word. It increasingly appears that the CIA, in particular, has been ignoring what few restraints have been imposed on it, externally and internally. On February 26, maximum spy Stansfield Turner admitted that although the CIA had issued a directive in 1977 prohibiting its agents from using professors, journalists, and clergymen as secret helpers, it has gone on merrily authorizing exceptions to that directive. Nor has the Agency informed any of the congressional committees charged with "oversight" of the CIA that it has been breaking its own rules. (Some "oversight.")

Admiral Turner, moreover, disclosed on February 21 that he has been airily evading a Senate resolution requiring him to let at least a few members of Congress know, in advance, about covert intelligence operations. At his confirmation hearing in 1977, Turner had said he would indeed comply with that Senate resolution. But since then, certain plots have been hatched which even highly placed and sanitized members of Congress couldn't be trusted to know. And so the CIA Director kept it all inside the Agency. What could those operations have involved? And where? If the Freedom of Information Act is eviscerated, no civilians will ever know. And are those secret operations still going on? If so, at what danger to the planet? That we'll never know either, even at the last immolation.

Not fewer, but many more, restraints are needed on the CIA and the other intelligence agencies. And certainly no weakening of the Freedom of Information Act. Without restraints, and with a War President in the White House (either Carter or some other danger to the species), what is to prevent another Operation CHAOS, for instance? During that domestic CIA surveillance of innocent citizens, we now find out—thanks to the FOIA—that more than 300,000 names of Americans were cross-indexed in CIA files. And, as the editors of the *DOCUMENTS* book discovered, "thousands of Americans were placed on 'watch lists,' which meant having their mail opened and their telegrams read."

Meanwhile, envious that the CIA may be freed from the Freedom of Information Act, the heads of the FBI, the National Security Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency recently appeared before the Senate Intelligence Committee to urge that, for the safety of the nation, their operations, too, be largely exempted from the FOIA. The President mightily approves.

CONTINUED

While not all members of Congress agree with Barry Goldwater ("We ought to do away with the whole damn thing"), there may be enough support for large-scale dismantling of the Freedom of Information Act to get such a bill passed this session. The long, complicated CIA and FBI charters (the Huddleston and Kennedy bills cited last week) will probably not pass this year. But a short scimitar of a bill disemboweling the FOIA has a good chance. Alert your Representatives and Senators.

After all, if the CIA is exempted from the FOIA, to be followed by the FBI and other intelligence agencies—while secrecy becomes epidemic in other government departments as an inexorable ramification of the Frank Snepp case—then hardly anyone in government need fear the citizenry at all anymore. At last, despite James Madison and other radical loonies back then, the people will have been subjugated and the Government, unimpeded by scrutiny, can put—and keep—everything in good order.

A few weeks ago, Senator Goldwater, infuriated by newspaper whistleblowing on secret CIA arms shipments to Afghan rebels, solemnly recommended before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee that journalists who publish "sensitive national security" information be tried for treason.

Soon, that may not be necessary. Journalists, like all other citizens—except for our revered leaders—will share common fateful ignorance of what is going on in our name. But, in the interim, remember that it is Jimmy Carter who is striving mightily to drown you in these waters of lethe. ■

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE I-4LOS ANGELES TIMES
18 March 1980

CIA Wins Again in Supreme Court

Not Required to Release Transcripts of Another U.S. Agency

From a Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—The Supreme Court handed another legal victory Monday to the Central Intelligence Agency, rejecting contentions that the agency is required by the Freedom of Information Act to turn over transcripts of a closed congressional hearing held 33 years ago.

The court rebuffed efforts by two Washington researchers to obtain copies of a hearing by the old House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments on June 27, 1947, just before Congress enacted legislation setting up the CIA. A transcript of the hearing, marked

"secret," has been in the CIA's possession for more than three decades.

A year ago, a federal appeals court here ruled 2 to 1 that the CIA did not have to release the transcript under the Freedom of Information Act because the transcript is still under the effective control of Congress and is not an official CIA document. The Supreme Court decided without dissent Monday to let this appeals court ruling stand (Goland vs. CIA, 78-1924).

The effect of the lower court decision is to permit a government agency to refuse to make public documents given to it by another branch of the government.

Congress could choose to make the CIA hearing transcript public on its own, but it has not done so. The Freedom of Information Act applies only to the executive branch of government, not to Congress.

Last month, the CIA won a major legal battle at the Supreme Court when the justices held that the federal government can seize all of the profits earned by former CIA agents who write unauthorized books about their intelligence work. The ruling came in the case of Frank Snepp, author of the 1977 book "A Decent Interval."

THE PROGRESSIVE

April 1980

The war on open government

In 1917, Progressive Party founder Hiram Johnson told his fellow U.S. Senators, "The first casualty when war comes is truth." In the current Cold War revival, truth—or at least a mechanism for arriving at the truth—may again be endangered. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), a far-reaching disclosure statute enacted fourteen years ago, is under assault in Congress and the Supreme Court—and in the next few months it may be damaged beyond repair.

The Act allows public access to the information Washington uses to make its decisions. Although strengthened by amendments in 1974, the law has all too often been seen by Federal agencies as something to work around and not something to work within. Nevertheless, information released (often grudgingly and under court order) has sparked much-needed reforms, especially in protecting civil liberties. All that may change, however.

Current rumblings in the Senate, coming in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, portend an unleashing of the Central Intelligence Agency. The FOIA has been one of the major restraints on the agency. FOIA requests brought to light the CIA's use of American soldiers and scientists as unwitting guinea pigs in drug tests, and its extensive domestic spying operations. These disclosures, and others, led three years ago to modest reforms. Even Jimmy Carter, campaigning for President in 1976, complained that "the CIA has spied on our own people," and called for more controls.

Now President Carter tells us those bridles on the CIA are "unwarranted restraints," and several Senators, among them New York Democrat Daniel P. Moynihan, are pushing legislation to exempt the CIA from the disclosure law. The CIA itself has had a hand in writing the legislation, which would grant general FOIA requests only for "finished intelligence products," thus giving the agency a free hand until after the damage is done. It is claimed that the Act somehow crippled the CIA's intelligence-gathering operations, but what it has really done has been to discourage the CIA's more dubious "covert operations."

Like the CIA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation would like nothing better than to get the FOIA off its back. Under the proposed FBI charter, now in Congressional committee, claimants would have to wait seven years to see their FBI files. Furthermore, FBI Director William Webster wants the option of destroying any files after ten years.

Meanwhile, the Act is being held hostage in the Supreme Court by Henry Kissinger, Cyrus Vance, and others. In *Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press*, heard by the high court last October, the secretaries of state, former and present, argue that the 33,000-page transcript of Kissinger's phone calls, produced at public expense, is not an "agency record" and therefore is exempt from disclosure. If this view should prevail, it could open a wide loophole in the FOIA. One possibility is illustrated by an exchange between Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens and Kissinger's lawyer, David Ginsburg:

Stevens: "If someone is aware of an impending FOIA request and simply takes the documents home, is there no claim under the Act?"

Ginsburg: "That's correct."

Depending on how the Kissinger case and the new CIA and FBI charters are concluded—and FOIA defenders are not optimistic—the Act could be badly crippled. That would make all of us casualties of the war on open government information.

—STEVE BURKHOLDER

(Steve Burkholder is a free-lance writer in Madison, Wisconsin.)

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ON PAGE A2

THE WASHINGTON POST
15 March 1980

CIA Uses Agee Case in War on Freedom of Information Act

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

The strange case of Philip Agee has become one of the Central Intelligence Agency's prime exhibits in its campaign against the Freedom of Information Act.

A former CIA officer who resigned from the agency in 1968, Agee, 45, now is one of its most outspoken enemies. Since he resigned, he has made a career of exposing the names of CIA personnel and attacking the agency's methods. He also is entitled, like anyone else, to ask for CIA documents under the Freedom of Information Act.

"It is frankly disgraceful that we are required to assist him in his endeavors," CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci told a House subcommittee recently in pleading for a change in the legislation.

"Modification of the Freedom of Information Act makes sense," Sen. Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.) asserted in co-sponsoring a CIA bill that would put most of the agency's operational and technical records beyond the reach of the law.

"Congress," Wallop declared, "Never intended that the American taxpayers should pay to provide

Philip Agee with four full-time research assistants within the CIA, but that is exactly what happened under the law in 1978."

The implication is that such requests no longer would be permitted if Congress would give the CIA the extraordinary exemption it is seeking.

But the bill would do nothing of the sort. Instead, it would block freedom of information requests from newspapers, historians, civil libertarians and just about everyone and anyone except individuals such as Philip Agee.

Under the CIA proposal, the agency's operational and technical files would be immune from disclosure, except to Americans seeking records about themselves. The CIA still would have to entertain those requests. And that is all that Agee, an American citizen, has asked for: records about himself.

"We do not seek a total exemption," Carlucci said in his House testimony. He said the CIA had constructed "our amendment in such a manner as to keep all of our files accessible to American citizens and permanent resident aliens requesting information on themselves, subject to existing FOIA exemptions."

So far, Agee has gotten very little. On Nov. 9, 1977, he asked the CIA, among other agencies, for copies of "all files and records . . . that pertained to, referred to, or in any way related to himself." Last November, more than two years later, he filed suit in Federal court here under the Freedom of Information Act, saying that he had yet to get a single piece of paper from the CIA beyond a letter acknowledging receipt of his request.

Now, according to court records, Agee wants to drop the lawsuit. From its rhetoric on the issue, it appears that the CIA would be only too happy to accommodate him. But the government is expected to try to keep the case alive in order to press a counterclaim it filed against Agee last month for his anti-CIA writings.

CIA officials refused to discuss Agee's suit, but according to the agency's annual report to Congress last year, the CIA had "already expended four man-years"—the equivalent of four men working a year—on Agee's request and might spend as much as "nine man-years of labor" by the time it was finished.

"Thus," CIA Deputy Director for Administration Don I. Wortman reported on April 2, 1979, "The requester [Agee] is not only succeeding in tying up the time of agency experts, but, in addition, can be expected to use whatever information is ultimately released in his efforts to discredit the agency and destroy its operations."

The suggestion that the freedom of information law enables Agee to pry damaging secrets from the CIA willy-nilly is not supported by the record. The law already allows the CIA to withhold documents that would disclose sources and methods or endanger national security. And CIA Deputy Director Carlucci asserted last year, in a letter to the Office of Management and Budget, that the information the agency releases under the law "is more often than not of little use to the recipient."

In addition, Agee, who currently lives in West Germany, is the subject of "an intensive counterintelligence investigation," court records show. The Freedom of Information Act permits withholding investigatory records on various grounds.

According to one of Agee's lawyers, Melvin Wulf of New York, the CIA has given them nothing beyond a two-inch-thick personnel file that was turned over two weeks ago.

"They told us at a status conference [on the lawsuit] that that . . . was about 10 percent of what they had—which means they might be coming up with about 20 inches of documents," Wulf recalls. "That doesn't sound like nine man-years to me. . . . They've been working the Agee angle in order to destroy the Freedom of Information Act."

Justice Department lawyers who are defending the CIA and other agencies in the Agee case filed a counterclaim against him Feb. 5 in an effort to confiscate the profits of two controversial books he helped write that exposed the names of CIA agents in Western Europe and Africa.

Encouraged by a Supreme Court decision expanding the CIA's censorship powers, government attorneys also are seeking an injunction that would require Agee to submit all his future writings to the CIA for review.

The government says it needs the freedom of information suit as a vehicle to make its case.

"Plaintiff [Agee] has resided abroad since the late 1960s and he has not been subject to the jurisdiction of any United States court," the Justice Department said in a memo filed with U.S. District Court Judge Gerhard A. Gesell. "Now, through his own actions, this court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff. Thus, for the first time in nearly 11 years, the United States may assert claims against Philip Agee."

The American Civil Liberties Union has joined in the litigation, arguing that Agee has the right to drop his own lawsuit. A hearing has been set for March 27.

The outcome is uncertain, but it is clear that the government is more interested in keeping Agee's widely deplored Freedom of Information Act request alive than Agee is. The CIA has found it useful in more ways than one.

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SOVIET GERM WARFARE

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THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
20 March 1980

US awaits 'germ warfare' details

Washington

The US administration is awaiting clarification of reports that the Soviet Union may have violated international conventions against biological (germ) warfare, Monitor correspondent John K. Cooley reports.

Reports from European émigré and intelligence sources of a mysterious illness, possibly linked to an accident last year in the Soviet city of Sverdlovsk, where such weapons have been reported stockpiled, are still being evaluated by US analysts.

The US and the Soviets, with 85 other countries, have signed and ratified a 1925 Geneva agreement banning development and use of both chemical and biological weapons. Soviet forces have reportedly used poison gas recently in Afghanistan in violation of this accord.

On Monday the NATO supreme allied commander, Gen. Bernard W. Rogers (USA), urged that the US produce chemical weapons for NATO to deter the Soviets from using their large existing chemical arsenal. The US destroyed its existing stocks of bacteriological weapons before President Ford's administration signed the Geneva accord in 1975. The Soviet Foreign Ministry Wednesday described as "impudent slander" a US suggestion that Moscow might have been violating an international treaty on biological warfare research. "This is just the latest invention of American propaganda."

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NEW YORK TIMES
20 MARCH 1980

Moscow Rejects Germ-Warfare Report as 'Slander'

By CRAIG R. WHITNEY

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, March 19 — The Foreign Ministry denounced as "impudent slander" today a suggestion by the State Department that biological-warfare germs escaped in April 1979 and infected people in Sverdlovsk, a large city in the Urals.

A spokesman, Aleksandr K. Voznikov, read from a prepared statement that concentrated mainly on the issue of whether the Soviet Union was violating the terms of a 1973 agreement banning the development, production or stockpiling of biological agents or toxins.

The State Department said yesterday that an outbreak of disease in Sverdlovsk last spring had raised questions about Soviet observance of the pact.

"This is just the latest invention of American propaganda," the Soviet statement said. "There is no basis for such assertions."

Moscow has also denounced as outright lies recent allegations by the United States Government that Soviet troops were using poison gas in Afghanistan.

No Explanation Given

The United States Embassy here was apparently not the source of the reports of the alleged accident in Sverdlovsk. Ambassador Thomas J. Watson Jr. was informed of the reports last weekend and, apparently on Monday, asked the Foreign Ministry for an explanation. None was provided, according to diplomatic informants. The embassy spokesman re-

ferred requests for information to the State Department in Washington.

Sverdlovsk is a city of 1.2 million people in one of a number of Soviet areas closed to foreigners.

A conservative West German mass-circulation tabloid, Bild Zeitung, which has no correspondent here, reported last month that a lethal biological agent escaped from a defense plant near Sverdlovsk on April 3 and killed more than a thousand people.

Now, a British news magazine, said in October that a germ-warfare accident had occurred in Novosibirsk in Siberia. Novosibirsk, which is open to foreigners, has a population of 1.3 million.

Diplomats and science attachés at several Western embassies here said today that they had no independent information about either of the alleged incidents.

Tass, the Government's press agency, maintained silence about the State Department report, and Mr. Voznikov's statement was given only to two news agencies, Reuters and The Associated Press, after they had asked for reaction.

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THE WASHINGTON STAR
19 March 1980

U.S. Believes Soviet Anthrax Killed 200-300

By Walter Taylor
Washington Star Staff Writer

The United States has what it considers strong evidence that the Soviet Union is developing a bacteriological warfare capability, in violation of a 1975 international agreement banning such development.

The evidence, according to government sources, includes intelligence reports on an explosion at a Soviet research facility in the Ural Mountains last spring in which heavy concentrations of deadly anthrax bacteria were scattered over a wide, heavily populated area.

The intelligence reports estimate that between 200 and 300 Russian civilians died in the aftermath of the explosion, which occurred near the industrial city of Sverdlovsk, about 1,000 miles east of Moscow.

Anthrax is an infectious disease born by cud-chewing animals and transmittable to humans when its spores are inhaled. Symptoms include painful, festering skin lesions. In acute cases, anthrax can be fatal in one to two days.

Although once the scourge of cattle and sheep ranchers, the disease now is rare in the United States. There were no cases reported last year.

The anthrax-causing bacteria was among the biological agents in the U.S. stockpile when the United States renounced the use of biological warfare in 1969.

Extensive research was done on anthrax as a weapon by the United States during World War II for use as a response — and thus a deterrent — to use by Nazi Germany. While virulent strains of the organism were created at a then-secret installation at Fort Detrick, Md., the U.S. Army Chemical Corps found anthrax a disappointing weapon at the time.

Anthrax, in fact, may be one of the few biological agents ever used against the United States. German agents in this country during World

War I are thought to have been successful in infecting military livestock bound for Europe with the disease.

Intelligence sources said there was no plausible explanation for the outbreak near Sverdlovsk other than an accident at a facility where anthrax bacterium was being produced or tested.

The reports were the first confirmation of stories published in Europe in recent months about Soviet development of bacteriological warfare capacity. Such development is forbidden under terms of a 1975 Biological Warfare Convention signed by the Soviet Union, the United States and 85 other countries.

The convention bans the development, production, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining of biological agents "of types or in quantities that have no justification" for peaceful purposes.

Sources familiar with the intelligence reports said yesterday that they saw no way experimentation with anthrax bacteria would be permissible under the convention.

At the State Department yesterday, spokesman David Passage confirmed that the United States has asked the Soviets to "clarify the circumstances" of the incident at Sverdlovsk.

A U.S. delegation headed by Ambassador Charles Flowerree is attending a review conference in Geneva of signatories to the biological warfare convention. Passage said the United States is hopeful of receiving a response to its query before the conference ends on Friday.

Passage stopped short of charging the Soviets with a violation of the convention, saying only that there were "disturbing indications of an outbreak of disease" at Sverdlovsk last spring.

Passage said the United States would await a response to its clarification request before deciding whether to formally charge the Soviets with a violation of the treaty.

Asked if a violation by the Soviet Union would permit the United States to renounce the convention, he said: "The United States unilaterally renounced the use of biological warfare. It would be inconsistent with that policy to use a Soviet violation as a pretext for something that we want to see prohibited."

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NEW YORK TIMES
19 MARCH 1980

SOVIET MISHAP TIED TO GERM-WAR PLANT

U.S. Sees Possible Breach of Ban in Reportedly Fatal Accident

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 18 — The United States said today that it had received "disturbing indications" that a large number of people in Sverdlovsk, a major Soviet city, might have been accidentally contaminated a year ago by a "lethal biological agent."

A State Department spokesman, David Passage, said an "outbreak of disease" in Sverdlovsk, a city of 1.2 million people, had raised questions whether the Soviet Union had violated the terms of a 1975 convention that bans the development, production or stockpiling of biological agents or toxins.

"The United States has recently expressed concern to the Soviet Union about these reports," he said. The matter is being discussed this week in Geneva at a meeting on problems arising from the treaty that bans germ warfare and was signed by the United States, the Soviet Union and 85 other countries, he said.

Although a West German publication had asserted that more than 1,000 people died after an explosion in a plant producing bacteriological weapons, the American spokesman provided few details.

"There have been some disturbing indications," the spokesman said, "that an outbreak of disease in the Soviet city of

Sverdlovsk in the spring of 1979 may have resulted from inadvertent exposure of large numbers of people to some sort of lethal biological agent."

"The indications raise questions about whether such material was present in quantities inconsistent with the ban in the biological weapons convention on developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining biological agents or toxins."

The matter came to light in unusual fashion. On Friday, the daily report of the Foreign Broadcasts Information Service, a Government agency that publishes transcripts of broadcasts and reprints some articles from the foreign press, carried two items from the newspaper Bild Zeitung of Hamburg, a sensationalist tabloid with a circulation of 4.7 million.

The two items, published Oct. 27, 1979, and Feb. 13, dealt with reports of explosions in Soviet plants allegedly making bacteriological weapons.

It is rare for the Government's foreign broadcasts report to carry material more than two weeks old. There was speculation that publication of the Bild Zeitung articles was designed to stimulate public discussion as part of the Government's effort to discredit the Soviet Union following its intervention in Afghanistan.

This was substantiated by a senior intelligence official who said the timing was "no accident." He said publication of the reports from Bild Zeitung was "part of a major effort to rev up public opinion about Soviet activity in the area of chemical and biological warfare." There have been persistent reports of Soviet use of chemical agents, such as poison gas, against Afghan insurgents.

Another official said the United States had evidence to believe that the agent in the Sverdlovsk accident was a highly potent bacteria that causes the disease known as anthrax, which is almost always fatal to humans when inhaled. He said there was evidence that 300 to 500 people died in a matter of hours and that Soviet troops had sealed off the area when the accident occurred.

Sverdlovsk, 875 miles east of Moscow, is the center of a major Soviet industrial district in the Ural Mountains, with a wide range of mineral extraction and manufacturing. The city, with a population of 1.2 million, is one of the country's leading producers of heavy machinery, including metallurgical and chemical equipment. Prior to 1924 it was known as Yekaterinburg, and it was here that Czar Nicholas II and his family were killed by the Bolsheviks in 1918.

Area Off Limits to Foreigners

Together with the entire Urals region, Sverdlovsk is normally off limits to foreigners, presumably because of the presence of military industries. In view of the travel ban, the State Department spokesman was asked about the Government's source of information.

"The information has come to us over a period of time and we have in effect been compiling additional information as it became available," he said. "It was only recently that we felt we had enough information that we should probably approach the Soviets about it in the terms of the biological convention. We are not necessarily charging a violation."

Intelligence aides said the information had been based on accounts from Soviet emigrants from the area. There was no independent confirmation.

The account in Bild Zeitung, which some officials said was probably exaggerated, said "deadly bacteria polluted the air" after an explosion in a plant making bacteriological weapons on April 3, 1979. People were contaminated by breathing in the agent, it said, and a special section was set up in a hospital staffed by army doctors and nurses to handle the cases.

The Bild Zeitung article said there was no remedy and "contaminated people died within four hours after hospitalization because their lungs and trachea were paralyzed."

There has been no known account of such an incident in the Soviet press, but this in itself is not unusual. However, the Soviet Government press agency, Tass, did rebut the West German articles in its international service, aimed at foreign audiences. The rebuttal, on Feb. 19, said that Bild Zeitung was contributing to "anti-Soviet hysteria" and that the Soviet Union was adhering strictly to the 1975 convention on bacteriological weapons.

"This report by the West German paper is from beginning to end a malicious invention that has absolutely nothing to do with actual fact," the Soviet press agency said.

The convention on banning bacteriological weapons was signed in 1972 and went into effect three years later. Under its terms, the signers undertake not to develop, produce, stockpile or acquire biological agents or toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful use."

All such material was supposed to have been destroyed by late 1975. In January 1976, all heads of Federal departments certified to President Gerald R. Ford that, as of Dec. 26, 1975, their departments and agencies were in full compliance with the convention.

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ASPIN'S BILL

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THE BALTIMORE SUN
17 March 1980

Aspin bill seeks notice of covert CIA operations

Washington (AP)—The CIA would be forced to tell Congress before launching undercover operations—even those limited to simply gathering information—under legislation proposed yesterday by Representative Les Aspin (D, Wis.).

Bills already pending would require prior notice for "covert operations"—those aimed at actually interfering in occurrences in other nations.

But Mr. Aspin said his bill, which he planned to introduce today, also would cover "major intelligence-collection actions since they can pose serious political problems if exposed as, for example, in the case of the U-2 spy plane flights over Russia."

Mr. Aspin unveiled his bill one day before the House Intelligence Committee was scheduled to hear from the Central Intelligence Agency's director, Adm. Stansfield Turner, on other proposals aimed at freeing U.S. spy agencies from various restraints.

Admiral Turner already has told the Senate Intelligence Committee that he and President Carter will fight a pro-

posed Senate "CIA charter" provision requiring prior notice—at least to congressional leaders—before big or risky covert operations.

Mr. Aspin, who is a member of the House Intelligence Committee, is one of a number of congressmen who maintain the CIA already is required to give such notice. The CIA, Admiral Turner made clear, does not agree.

The proposed charter and numerous other bills also aim to meet specific CIA requests: Ordering criminal penalties for people who identify secret agents, cutting down the number of congressional committees to which the agency reports and freeing it from many of the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act.

Mr. Aspin said his bill walks the line between congressmen who want to "unleash" the CIA from nearly all restraints and those who are most concerned with assuring "the public that it will be protected from molestation by agencies that cannot by definition operate in public."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-13NEW YORK TIMES
17 MARCH 1980

ASPIN BILL PROVIDES TIGHTER C.I.A. REIN

Wisconsin Democrat Seeks More
Congressional Oversight With
Relief From Some Curbs

By CHARLES MOHR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 16 — One of the Congressmen responsible for overseeing the Central Intelligence Agency argues that, contrary to assertions by other legislators and President Carter, existing laws and regulations have neither hindered a continuing program of covert operations abroad nor seriously compromised agency secrets.

The Congressman, Representative Les Aspin, Democrat of Wisconsin, said he would introduce legislation tomorrow that would strengthen, rather than weaken, "the Congressional tether on the intelligence community." At the same time, he asserted that his bill would give the C.I.A. relief from some onerous restraints and requirements.

In a speech prepared for delivery tomorrow in the House, Mr. Aspin said he was offering his bill as an alternative to two bills pending in the Senate.

The proposal by Mr. Aspin, chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Intelligence Committee and a specialist in defense policy, is in marked contrast to some other measures meant to "unleash" the intelligence agencies and to remove what President Carter has asserted are "unwarranted" restraints on the agencies.

Mr. Aspin said in his prepared speech that myths and "false issues" had distorted debate on Congressional oversight of the C.I.A. and other intelligence activities and contributed to pressures to relax such oversight.

To Avoid 'Good Old Days'

He said his proposed bill, the Intelligence Activities Act of 1980, was meant to "prevent a return to the 'good old days' that proved to be an embarrassment to us as a nation while at the same time recognizing that our intelligence services cannot be expected to operate in a fishbowl."

Other proposed bills are aimed at demolishing the so-called Hughes-Ryan amendment of 1974, which, in conjunction with Congressional rules, has theoretically permitted the full membership of eight Congressional committees to hear the intelligence agency's reports on covert operations. Advocates of such change have argued that, by increasing the risk of unauthorized disclosure, the law has hindered covert acts meant to influence the course or outcome of events abroad.

"But where are all these leaks supposedly caused by Hughes-Ryan?" Mr. Aspin asked. "We are doing a fair amount of covert operations now and have been for some time; they are not being leaked."

The argument that present law had "crippled" American foreign policy is fallacious, he added, "since covert actions continue daily."

Finds Distortion on Reporting

He also contended that there had been gross distortion in descriptions of how the Hughes-Ryan reporting system actually worked. Instead of hundreds of members of Congress being privy to clandestine operations, he maintained that in practice only 27 members of the House, 19 Senators and 17 staff members of the two bodies received such reports.

Arguing that this was "not an unreasonable number," he added, "The key to avoiding covert action disasters is the assurance that a cross section of people will consider" such operations.

"A number of covert actions blew up in our faces in the past because they were terrible ideas to begin with," he said. "They were put together by a handful of true believers who prevented anyone who might question their judgment from having a say."

His bill would provide that two members from "appropriate" committees other than the two intelligence panels continue to receive briefings on covert operations. The House and Senate would make their own rules on this matter, but under current practices, this would involve six members from each house belonging to the Foreign Relations, Armed Services and Appropriations Committees in each chamber.

These 12, added to the 27 members of the two intelligence committees, would make 39 members of Congress eligible for briefings on covert actions.

For Prior Notification

Mr. Aspin's legislation would also flatly require, without apparent exception, prior notification to Congress of all covert actions, as well as "full" and complete notification of all other intelligence information.

The Carter Administration and the C.I.A. have strongly opposed a proposal by Senator Walter D. Huddleston, Democrat of Kentucky, that would mandate prior notification, even to a limited number of Congressional figures. A senior intelligence official said last week that the Aspin bill was even less acceptable to the C.I.A.

Mr. Aspin's speech was clearly intended to try to offset arguments that measures taken several years ago to curb excesses and illegalities by the intelligence services had gone too far and were now somehow impeding an effective intelligence effort.

However, his bill may generate little support, in the view of some House sources. He would flatly prohibit the use of clergymen, journalists and professors as spies and their institutions as "cover" for the C.I.A. He would also refuse to exempt the agency, as it wishes to be, from the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. Instead, the bill would protect foreign information sources in the agency's files from being divulged by requests made under the Freedom of Information Act.

The Aspin bill appeared to be somewhat more restrictive than Senator Huddleston's proposed National Intelligence Act, which is meant to create a "charter" for the intelligence community. Mr. Aspin called the Huddleston bill too complex to be passed this year. He said of a measure by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Democrat of New York, is designed to give the C.I.A. relief from what it calls onerous burdens, that it was an "excessively simple" proposal that would be a step backward.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 49THE WASHINGTON POST
17 March 1980

Aspin Plans to Introduce New CIA Charter Proposal

By George Lardner Jr.

Washington Post Staff Writer

Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.) said yesterday he plans to introduce a proposed new charter for the CIA aimed at avoiding the pitfalls of the bills now before Congress.

Aspin, chairman of the House Intelligence Oversight subcommittee, said he recognized he was "adding to a legislative landscape on the verge of becoming crowded" but said he thinks a new proposal needed to steer a middle course between too much regulation and too little.

The key bills now are a comprehensive, 172-page proposal by Sen. Walter D. Huddleston (D-Ky.) and an abbreviated version sponsored by Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.).

Aspin said he thought the Huddleston proposal "an exceedingly complex bill, confusing, suffering from too much compromise all the way around."

The Moynihan bill, on the other hand, Aspin contended, is "excessively simple" and "gives the intelligence community relief from every ill it either has suffered or has fancied it might suffer under the law or at the hands of the Congress."

In its initial form, the Moynihan proposal would make it easier for the CIA to initiate covert actions; restrict reports to the Senate and House Intelligence committees, exempt most CIA operations from the Freedom of Information Act and make it a crime to disclose the names of CIA operatives abroad.

Aspin said his bill to be introduced today, would:

- Protect undercover agents from having their names published by pro-

viding penalties for present or past CIA officials who intentionally disclose such names or the means for identifying them. Unlike other proposals, however, "the bill contains no restrictions whatsoever on the press."

- Require advance notice of major covert actions and major intelligence-gathering operations by any government agency to the Senate and House Intelligence committees. The information would be shared with key members of other congressional committees such as House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations.

- Add a proviso concerning the Freedom of Information Act to make it clear that nothing in the law requires disclosure of any intelligence links or informational exchanges with foreign governments or sources.

- Permit surveillance of Americans abroad under a system of secret court-issued warrants, "based on a criminal standard." Spying on Americans solely because they have information the government deems important would not be permitted.

- Prohibit the paid use of journalists, clergymen and academics for intelligence purposes. Similarly, CIA agents would not be allowed to pose as journalists, clergymen or academics.

Aspin said his bill "is intended neither to emasculate the intelligence services or to allow them free run of the globe." He called it "an honest effort to provide those restraints that will prevent a return to the good old days that proved to be an embarrassment to us as a nation while at the same time recognizing that our intelligence services cannot be expected to operate in a goldfish bowl like some social service agency."

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CLERGY, JOURNALISTS AND MISSIONARIES

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THE NEW YORK TIMES
19 March 1980

Ban on Use of Missionaries Sought

WASHINGTON, March 18 (UPI) — The foreign mission board of the nation's largest Protestant denomination, the Southern Baptist Convention, today urged President Carter, a member, to establish a clear policy forbidding the use of missionaries or church workers in intelligence-gathering efforts by the C.I.A. and F.B.I.

The Administration has suggested relaxing the current ban against the use of church workers, journalists and academics by the C.I.A.

HARTFORD COURANT(CONN.)
28 FEBRUARY 1980

The CIA and Journalists

The more we read about the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency the more we are convinced that a charter, strictly defining the scope of permissible activities, is absolutely necessary.

Congress is currently trying to write a charter, but the Carter administration wants to keep definitions as broad as possible. One loose definition relates to the use of journalists, clergymen and academics as CIA informers. The White House would like charter language that permits enlisting the services of such people on certain occasions.

A general statement opposing, in principle, such hiring would be appropriate, according to the Washington intelligence community, but there should be room for exceptions.

A general statement will not do. Indeed even a specific statement, clearly defining what the CIA can and cannot do may not be enough. On Nov. 30, 1977, for example, CIA Director Stansfield Turner issued a directive saying his agency "will not enter into any relationships" with either full-time or part-time journalists "for the purpose of conducting any intelligence activities." This week, Mr. Turner admitted that he had waived provisions of his directive "in very limited occasions." He would not say what limited occasions, presumably because the answer would,

in Mr. Turner's opinion, jeopardize national security.

Mr. Turner argues that some circumstances may warrant the use of journalists, clergymen and academics, or their institutions, as covers for CIA activities. We disagree, particularly in the case of journalists.

Representatives of news organizations experience enough difficulties in gathering information overseas without being tarred as agents of their government. What distinguishes the United States from most other countries in the area of news gathering and dissemination is the presumed independence of our news organizations. That independence should be zealously guarded by the American people, and it can only be guarded if the CIA is emphatically proscribed by law from entering into any relationships with representatives of all news organizations.

CIA Director Turner's latest revelation that he had waived provisions of his own policy makes it obvious that the American people should not rely on the discretion of government. If Congress values the separation of church and state, the independence of the press and the integrity of academic work, it will prohibit the CIA from using these institutions or their representatives as CIA surrogates or informers under any circumstances.

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TIME
24 March 1980

CIA vs. Clergy

The church as "cover"?

The CIA has no secret paid or contractual relationship with any American clergyman or missionary. This practice will be continued as a matter of policy." So stated the executive guidelines of the Central Intelligence Agency, set in 1976 after a furor over alleged CIA use of some overseas missionaries. CIA policy also prohibits agents from using religious organizations as "cover" for intelligence work.

Now the U.S. Senate is working on a bill that would prohibit such cover, though it would not ban contractual or voluntary relations with individual missionaries. Though President Carter is very missionary-minded, his Administration favors the present method of self-regulation by the agency and is opposed to any legal ban on either cover or contracts. CIA Director Stansfield Turner stirred renewed controversy by admitting in testimony before a Senate committee that on three occasions he had already agreed to waive the CIA's rule against contracts with missionaries. There can be "unique circumstances," Turner said, in which clergymen are "the only means available" to operate "in a situation of the highest urgency and national importance."

Most religious organizations oppose both Admiral Turner's view and the proposed Senate bill, since it does not entirely forbid use of clergymen. Noting that in many Third World nations missionaries "are already seen as agents of imperialism," the Rev. Dean Kelley, the religious-liberty director of the National Council of Churches, is afraid that "the whole profession can be tainted if it is known that they can be a front for intelligence agencies." ■

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CHARTERS

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SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER
16 March 1980

Badly needed boost for the CIA

WHEN WE TAKE note that the weather has changed in Washington, D.C., the reference is not to the first whiff of spring but to congressional attitudes toward the CIA. This is a blessed change from the days going back to 1974 when Congress seemed grimly bent on the virtual dismemberment of the agency.

Late last week, the House Foreign Affairs Committee acted to repair the damage done in December, 1974, by an amendment to the Foreign Aid Act, sponsored by Sen. Harold Hughes, D-Iowa, and the late Rep. Leo Ryan of California. That amendment drastically curtailed the CIA's foreign operations "unless and until the president finds that each such operation is important to the national security and reports, in timely fashion, a description and scope of such operation to the appropriate committees of Congress."

As it developed, eight such committees were deemed "appropriate," involving so many members that the CIA might as well detail its plans at a press conference. You don't have to be an intelligence operative to know that a secret shared is a secret spilled.

Last week's committee action limits the

required report to the Senate and House Intelligence Committees, which is a definite improvement, although ample opportunities remain for a leak.

The CIA certainly needs congressional oversight, but not to the extent of having congressmen, a number of whom are incurable blabbermouths, peering over its shoulder at every turn.

Incidentally, in one of the more interesting episodes of the season, President Carter violated the requirement of a report to the committees in the recent rescue of six Americans from Iran with the collaboration of the Canadian Embassy in Tehran. The Canadians warned they would not lend themselves to this necessarily clandestine and risky undertaking if it were reported beforehand to Congress. So Carter went ahead on his own and the Americans got safely out.

Good for the Canadians (thanks again) and for Carter, too.

Modification of the Hughes-Ryan amendment will not altogether repair the costly damage done to the CIA's morale by a wave of ill-advised "reforms," but it will help. That is a plus for an agency that is crucial to the country's welfare and one that plays the international game in a very rough league.

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ON PAGE A9

THE WASHINGTON POST
20 March 1980

NSA Director Lauds 2 Intelligence Panels On Keeping Secrets

By George Lardner Jr.

Washington Post Staff Writer

The director of the National Security Agency said yesterday that his codebreaking organization's secrets have been better kept by the House and Senate Intelligence committees than they have been by the executive branch.

Testifying before the House Intelligence Committee, the NSA director, Vice Admiral B. R. Inman (USN), said he had no qualms about discussing even tightly guarded details about NSA "sources and methods" with the two congressional panels set up to oversee the intelligence community.

His views, expressed at a hearing on a proposed legislative charter for the U.S. intelligence community, seemed to contrast sharply with Tuesday's testimony by Central Intelligence Agency Director Stansfield Turner. The CIA director contended that he should not be required to disclose any intelligence sources or methods to the two committees.

The proposed charter would oblige the CIA and all other U.S. intelligence agencies to provide the intelligence committees with whatever information they feel they need. Turner took the position that this would conflict with his existing statutory duty as director of central intelligence to protect sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

Adm. Inman took no stand on whether full congressional access to information should be required by law—a step that the CIA and the Carter White House strongly oppose—but he said he has always felt free to discuss any NSA secrets with the intelligence committee.

By contrast, Inman said, "I'm not comfortable with a lot of discussions about sources and methods in the executive branch." He gave no examples, but he said "my experience with these two committees [Senate and House Intelligence] has been better than my experience with the executive branch has been."

Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.) said he agreed wholeheartedly and told Inman that "I'm just sorry you weren't here yesterday [Tuesday] morning" when Turner testified.

"That means I'm probably in trouble," Inman replied.

Turner said Tuesday that he would cut his budget for human intelligence collection in half if Congress passed a law requiring full access to information. He said it would have a "chilling effect" on sources abroad.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 20THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
20 March 1980

CIA Veterans Assess New Charter

By DAVID IGNATIUS

WASHINGTON — Walter Pforzheimer, the Central Intelligence Agency's first legislative counsel, helped bring the CIA to life in 1947 based on a few frail paragraphs that were woven into the National Security Act.

That first CIA charter was deliberately vague, Mr. Pforzheimer notes. It didn't mention espionage or covert action. It didn't explain that in fulfilling its mission, the new agency would systematically violate the laws of foreign countries. Instead, the few circumspect paragraphs sought to put the U.S. into the spy business quietly—without contaminating other government institutions.

"When Congress considered the legislation in 1947," Mr. Pforzheimer remembers, "they were telling us: 'We know you're doing it. We want you to do it. But we don't want to put the dirty words into the statute.'"

The old system collapsed, partly because it denied the CIA the healthy exchange of ideas and criticism that the agency needed. Congress, making up for its earlier inattention, aided the process of collapse during the mid-1970s with a series of exposes and investigations.

Congress is currently debating a new intelligence charter that seeks to spell out—in 171 deadening pages—all the things that were left unsaid in 1947. In the view of retired CIA officials like Mr. Pforzheimer, Congress has traded one form of unhealthy naivete about the CIA for another. For the new charter seems to assume that the business of spying—which seemed so dirty in 1947—can be made clean and wholesome if it is wrapped in enough legal procedure.

List of Do's and Don'ts

The charter effort began three years ago as a response to the CIA misdeeds that had been exposed by congressional committees. The initial version amounted to a list of do's and don'ts; it reflected the nearly universal sentiment in Congress that the CIA should be punished.

But by last year, the legislative mood had shifted to a new concern that the CIA had become hobbled by the exposes and restrictions. So a new version of the charter was drafted; according to its proponents, it seeks to bolster the agency by giving it a sound legal framework—and benevolent oversight from Congress and the courts.

The heart of the proposed charter is this effort to give Congress and the courts a bigger piece of the action on intelligence matters. Congress today, in contrast to 30 years ago, is eager to know the details of spy missions. So under the charter, congressional committees would be briefed, in advance, on CIA covert-action efforts. (The committees wouldn't have any power, however, to stop operations that seemed unwise.)

The courts are also ready to embrace espionage. Indeed, the American Bar Association has even formed a panel to consider the subtleties of intelligence law. So under the charter, U.S. courts would be given the peculiar responsibility for authorizing violations of foreign law, by issuing warrants for break-ins or surveillance overseas.

The oversight of dirty work would be shared. But Mr. Pforzheimer wonders, for example, whether it makes sense to ask U.S. judges to take actions that might be

considered part of a criminal conspiracy under the laws of some countries.

Mr. Pforzheimer, who retired from the CIA in 1977, discussed some of these potential problems posed by the charter in recent interviews at his home here. With him were two other members of the CIA's founding generation: John Warner, a former general counsel of the agency, and Sam Halpern, a former CIA officer who for many years recruited agents in the field and later assumed a high administrative post within the agency's clandestine service.

The conversations took place in Mr. Pforzheimer's elaborately guarded library, where he maintains what may be the world's largest private collection of intelligence books and artifacts.

In this dark, book-filled room, the history of intelligence comes alive. On the walls are paintings by Rudolph Abel, made while the captured Soviet spy languished in a U.S. prison during the 1950s. Shelves display such trinkets as Adolf Hitler's china and Hermann Goering's address book, both spirited out of Germany, and a fading French visa application that bears the name "Mata Hari."

Mr. Pforzheimer uses his collection to illustrate a basic argument: For centuries, intelligence has been a necessary and dangerous business. Discussing the risks of spying, he pulls out an original letter written to Nathan Hale, America's first great agent, before he was executed by the British during the Revolutionary War. And to explain what he views as the charter's fundamental flaw, Mr. Pforzheimer displays his greatest treasure: an original letter in which George Washington tried to describe what the core of the spy business is all about.

"The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent and need not be further urged," General Washington wrote. "All that remains for me to add is that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon secrecy, success depends...."

The proposed charter would violate the secrecy principle in numerous ways, according to Mr. Pforzheimer and his two colleagues. It would require that details of the CIA's most sensitive foreign operations be disclosed to members of the congressional intelligence committees, and presumably their staffs, before the operations were begun. What's more, the intelligence committees would have a statutory right to demand "any information" about intelligence activities—including the names of agents or the location of "safe houses" for agents.

Mr. Halpern notes that protecting such secrets is a life-and-death matter. Prospective agents, who often include senior officials of foreign governments, are desper-

ately worried that their role as American spies will be blown. These agents want to know exactly who in the U.S. government will know their names. The prospect that the list might include garrulous members of Congress who have never passed even a minimum security clearance would petrify such agents, Mr. Halpern contends.

Mr. Halpern recalls that years ago he attempted to recruit a key agent in the Far East who "had been burned once" by disclosure of his relationship with another spy service. Despite promises that only a handful of Americans would know his identity, the man refused to cooperate. "I gave him my best assurances, and he didn't believe me," Mr. Halpern says.

Those were the days when the CIA actually could protect sensitive information—even from top-level officials. Mr. Halpern remembers a call he received once from an Assistant to the Secretary of State, who said the Secretary wanted to know the source of a particular intelligence report. Mr. Halpern flatly refused the request. But he notes that under the charter, he might have to answer a similar question from a curious Congressman.

Mr. Warner, the CIA's former general counsel, worries that the charter's most damaging assault on secrecy may be a provision that would allow the General Accounting Office, an arm of Congress, to audit "all funds" appropriated for the intelligence community.

"The heart of the clandestine service is using clandestine funds," says Mr. Warner. "To run spies successfully," he explains, such secret off-book funds are needed to pay agents, train them and provide them with hardware. "The charter takes that away, by providing the GAO audit," he contends.

More Work for Lawyers

Mr. Pforzheimer, a lawyer himself, concludes that the most assured result of the charter would be to make more work for lawyers. In that respect, it is a perfect embodiment of the current legislative pathology in Washington.

In the future, Mr. Pforzheimer predicts, "every CIA case officer will have his own lawyer" to interpret the charter's wrinkles. The CIA's lawyers would talk to Congress's lawyers every time the agency planned a sensitive mission abroad. And when the CIA wanted to wiretap a suspected foreign spy, the agency's lawyers could talk to the Justice Department's lawyers, and then to the lawyers who sit as judges on a special foreign-intelligence court.

This is the tidy world of intelligence that the charter proposes—neatly bound with legal thread. The charter's proponents insist that without such controls, the CIA's operations will be hamstrung by public suspicion and doubt. Intelligence, they contend, is too important to be left to intelligence staffers alone.

Mr. Halpern, the longtime CIA case officer, concedes that some form of charter may be necessary. But he argues that U.S. intelligence will never survive as a regulated industry.

"Somewhere, somehow," he says, "somebody has to be trusted."

Mr. Ignatius, who covers the Senate for the Journal's Washington bureau, writes frequently about intelligence matters.

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THE WASHINGTON STAR
19 March 1980

Intelligence Charter Would OK Some Disruptive Tactics by FBI

By Allan Frank
Washington Star Staff Writer

FBI Director William H. Webster yesterday conceded that under certain circumstances the proposed national intelligence charter would permit his agency to engage in disinformation and disruption tactics against domestic political groups suspected of foreign connections.

Such tactics were part of the FBI's 15-year-long Cointelpro (counterintelligence program) that resulted in smear campaigns against Martin Luther King Jr., the anti-Vietnam war movement, actress Jean Seberg and others.

The proposed national intelligence charter would govern the conduct of all intelligence agencies overseas, and would set guidelines for the FBI mainly with regard to its responsibilities for counterintelligence work against foreign agents inside the United States.

The intelligence charter proposed

by the committee, Webster said, would allow the Cointelpro-type tactics. Webster was testifying before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

A separate charter controlling most of the FBI's other activities, inside the United States, such as federal law enforcement, also is under consideration by Congress and would prohibit Cointelpro-type activities.

Leon Feurth, an aide to House Intelligence Committee member Les Aspin, D-Wis., asked Webster whether the proposed charter would permit the FBI to revive Cointelpro tactics and the director answered, "I think that we probably could."

Webster told reporters, "The question is, 'Can we neutralize the impact of that effort (by persons gathering information for a foreign power) by causing false information and so forth to go through their intelligence-gathering power.'"

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THE WASHINGTON POST
19 March 1980

Charter Would Let FBI Disrupt Some Domestic Groups

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

FBI Director William H. Webster acknowledged yesterday that disruptive techniques could be used against domestic groups suspected of ties to foreign powers under a proposed new charter for the U.S. intelligence community.

Under questioning before the House Intelligence Committee, the FBI chief conceded that disinformation, campaigns and other counterintelligence tactics could be employed against U.S. citizens or groups who "may be engaged" in clandestine intelligence activities on behalf of a foreign power.

It was suspicions such as these that led to the employment of the FBI's controversial COINTELPRO (counterintelligence program) against the antiwar movement and other targets in the 1960s and early 1970s.

Webster told reporters after the House hearing that he doubted such tactics would be resurrected even if the bill were passed as it stands. He said he expects that additional safeguards will be laid down under secret guidelines to be promulgated by the attorney general under still other provisions of the legislation.

"We didn't draft the bill," the FBI director said of the measure. "It isn't something we tried to build in."

Webster added that "we may be talking about different things when we talk about 'disinformation.' One legitimate technique in any counterintelligence investigation is to make a foreign power uncertain about the reliability of its contacts in this country."

"I really see no relation between the counterintelligence activities [authorized] in this bill and the old COINTELPRO program," he said.

The possibility that some of the old tactics might be used again was raised by an aide to Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.). He noted toward the end of the hearing that except for some specific prohibitions such as one against assassinations, the bill would allow a full range of counterintelligence activity.

Other provisions of the intricate, 172-page measure state that "counterintelligence and counterterrorism" activities may be carried out against domestic groups and individuals without their consent when they are or "may be" engaged in terrorism or in espionage on behalf of a foreign power.

"Certain ranges of activities may not be expressly prohibited," Webster told reporters after testifying that "we probably could" use disinformation and disruption. He said that Congress could add more prohibitions as far as he is concerned.

The bill was drafted by the Senate Intelligence Committee in conjunction with the Carter administration over the past several years. The administration, however, has refused to endorse it primarily because of provisions that would entitle the House and Senate Intelligence committees to prior notice of covert CIA actions and to whatever after-the-fact information they want about U.S. intelligence activities.

Testifying earlier in the day "on behalf of the president," CIA Director Stansfield Turner sharply criticized this prior notice provision and charged that it amounted to an unwarranted attempt by Congress to gain veto power over covert actions.

Although the bill specifically states that congressional approval of such actions is not required, Turner dismissed this as meaningless because, he said, "every individual with access to the prior notification would have the power to veto the activity through a threat to disclose it."

Committee Chairman Edward Boland (D-Mass.) said Turner's testimony suggested "a rather low vote of confidence" in the congressional committees to be supplied with the secret notifications, but Turner said he wanted to make it clear that "we're not just talking about notification, we're talking about approval."

"It is the executive branch's responsibility," Turner added later in an exchange with Aspin about covert actions, "and it is not proper to share that responsibility with the Congress."

The CIA director also charged that his Feb. 21 testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee has been

"seriously misrepresented in the press." Turner was reported as having said in an exchange with Sen. Walter D. Huddleston (D-Ky.) that the CIA had been holding back from Congress more information about covert actions than its members had suspected.

Calling this "patently false" Turner said prior notice has been withheld from Congress on only one occasion in the Carter administration. When his testimony was read back to him by Rep. Romano Mazzoli (D-Ky.), Turner said he "may have misunderstood" Huddleston's question.

Turner said he had, in any case, simply been trying to disabuse Huddleston of the impression that other lawmakers had been told of the covert operation in question while the Intelligence committees had not. The CIA director said this was not the case, as far as he knew.

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ON PAGE A-20

NEW YORK TIMES
19 MARCH 1980

Turner Says Congress Units Were Told of All Covert Intelligence Actions

By CHARLES MOHR
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 18 — Adm. Stansfield Turner, the Director of Central Intelligence, said today that he had never withheld knowledge of covert American intelligence operations from Congressional committees authorized to receive such reports.

But Admiral Turner, testifying before the House Intelligence Committee, said that one reason that he firmly opposed a legal obligation to give prior notice of such clandestine actions to the committees was that it would permit Congress to make an "excessive intrusion" into Presidential decision making.

Admiral Turner argued that the requirements of Congressional oversight would be fully met if the authorized committees learned of covert operations only after they were completed and if they received "sufficient information to allow a judgment as to legality and propriety."

Disclosure Threat as Veto

The head of the Central Intelligence Agency said, "Every individual with access to prior to notification would have the power to veto the activity through a threat to disclose it."

Admiral Turner told the House Committee today that his testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee on Feb. 21 had been "seriously misrepresented in the press." News accounts centered on his statement that it was "not correct" that at least some members of Congress had been informed of all covert actions by the C.I.A.

He went on to say that in the last three years, all covert actions except one were described to authorized committees before being carried out. He said that in the case of the exception, Congress was notified within hours "of the risks being behind us." Other informed sources said that the exception was the case of six Americans who were spirited out of Iran with the help of the Canadian Embassy.



United Press International

Stansfield Turner appearing before the House panel on intelligence.

While Admiral Turner said today that the press was to blame for misinterpreting his February remarks to the Senate committee, Senate sources said that he had told the Senate committee in closed session that he had not understood the question that led to his controversial answer, and thus admitted that he had given a misleading response. He told the

House committee today that only in closed, secret session could he fully explain his answer to the Senate committee.

Representative Les Aspin, Democrat of Wisconsin, said that he was "very disturbed" by Admiral Turner's testimony. Mr. Aspin said Congress did not have and did not seek a veto power on covert operations. Prior notification, he said, would require intelligence agency planners to justify ideas that sometimes "mesmerize" those involved in undercover work but seem "crazy" to anyone else.

He cited a plan that was once advanced within the C.I.A. to give a disease-infested diving suit to Cuba's leader, Fidel Castro.

Admiral Turner responded that "what you have just described is a process of in-

volving Congress in decision making" because it involved a Congressional effort to achieve "better decisions."

MINNEAPOLIS TRIBUNE (MN)

6 March 1980

A new reason for a CIA charter

CIA chief Stansfield Turner didn't mean to do so, but he recently provided a good argument for giving Congress better control of his agency. In an appearance before the Senate Intelligence Committee, Turner generally supported a bill to establish a legislative charter for his agency, but spoke against a provision that would require the CIA to give Congress confidential notice of risky covert activities abroad. Then, almost off-handedly, he disclosed that he has not always notified Congress of such activities, despite his promise to do so.

The promise was made during Turner's confirmation hearings before the same committee in 1977. He said then that he would give Congress confidential notice of covert actions except on "an extremely rare occasion" when "something might come up in the middle of the night." That narrow exception, his recent testimony makes clear, has been unilat-

erally widened. How far is not clear; Turner didn't say.

What is clear, however, is that Americans cannot rely on private promises to give their elected representatives a chance to oversee the CIA and to guard against abuses of its power. The nation needs a good intelligence-gathering agency, and some secrecy is necessary to achieve that end. But the nation does not need an agency that secretly, on its own, undertakes foreign programs that can have significant foreign-policy implications. Unelected officials, even intelligence agents, must be accountable to elected officials who, in turn, are accountable to the public. Turner's testimony underscored not the point he intended to make, but the opposite: that the effective way to impose such accountability on the CIA is through legislation.

THE PORTLAND OREGONIAN
23 February 1980

Give the CIA a flexible leash

The proposed legislative charter for the Central Intelligence Agency, aimed at preventing abuses against citizens' rights, is a long, tedious primer of "do's and don't's," which will prove difficult for the Congress to enforce and impossible for the CIA to follow without greatly inhibiting its vital and legitimate covert activities.

Hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, headed by Sen. Birch Bayh, D-Ind., have revealed wide differences between the new bill (named for its sponsor, Sen. Walter D. Huddleston, D-Ky.) and the administration.

Among the Huddleston bill's provisions objected to by the administration are the required prior notification to the Congress of covert activities; prohibitions against agents posing as newsmen, clergymen or academic persons; and an expansion of criminal penalties against former CIA officials who reveal the identity of intelligence operators to include "anyone" who discloses their identities, having knowledge that the information was based on classified material. This could apply to the press or private individuals.

The problem with trying to cover every contingency is that it is difficult to legislate in this area without trampling the rights of a free society, including the Freedom of Information Act, which applies to the CIA (except for documents

it can invoke national security arguments to protect).

What seems missing in efforts to write a CIA charter is a spirit of cooperation between the intelligence agencies and those congressmen charged with oversight efforts. The lesson of the past is that cooperation too often degenerated into a cozy arrangement under which the CIA light was always green, encouraging secret wars and plans for assassinations of heads of state.

The Congress should attempt to simplify the new CIA charter, which runs to 81 columns of fine print in the Federal Register, while at the same time protecting the basic rights of American citizens, both at home and abroad. This means keeping the CIA on a light leash, under restraint, exercised by making certain its officials respect the fundamental traditions of a democratic society.

Fortunately for the CIA, recent events abroad have demonstrated it has vital work to do. It should be the business of Congress and the executive to see that its necessary covert operations are protected, while at the same time standing ready to reel the agency in if it gets bogged down in bureaucracy or is carried away by cloak and dagger schemes dangerous to a free society.

ST. LOUIS GLOBE DEMOCRAT
13 March 1980

NEW SPARK FOR U.S. INTELLIGENCE

The mood of the nation has taken a turn for the better with an increasing acknowledgement that crippling U.S. intelligence forces was an error of major proportions.

One of the most encouraging signs of the changing times is the growing support for rewriting charters of both the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. To fill the dangerous intelligence void that has been created, it is being proposed that the two agencies be granted increased powers in some areas while their methods in other areas be restricted.

The breakdown of effective U.S. intelligence-gathering was exposed first by events in Iran and followed up by the invasion of Afghanistan. The collapse was an inevitable price that had to be paid for handcuffing the country's security agencies.

The decades of the '70s left U.S. security wanting as a war of extermination was directed at the CIA and other units. The Hughes-Ryan amendment and the Freedom of Information Act took their toll. The Senate and House Internal Security committees were abolished.

The changes are paying off—for enemies of the United States. Distrust over the CIA's ability to guarantee total secrecy to informants is rampant. Foreign agents who formerly worked with this country have terminated their relationships and other spy networks decline to enter into cooperative arrangements.

FBI Director William H. Webster has complained in testimony before Congress that under existing law the agency is

required to provide sensitive information and records to "any person...even a citizen of a hostile nation." As a result its sources are drying up.

National security is endangered when agencies are forced to broadcast their secrets. Good judgment was displayed by CIA Director Stansfield Turner who did not relay the information to Capitol Hill after his agency had learned that the Canadian diplomatic mission in Tehran was providing sanctuary to six employees of the U.S. Embassy.

The episode had a happy ending. Revealing the information prematurely to Congress would have had no beneficial effect. The ending could have been considerably different. A careless mention of the secret could have endangered both Americans and Canadians at the mission.

Questionable covert actions are not condoned. Controls and curbs in specific areas can be spelled out. However, reckless destruction of necessary intelligence functions is not the proper prescription.

Congress has wielded the axe without concern for U.S. security. An overhaul of the previous alleged reforms that actually obstructed the collection of intelligence is overdue. The White House reports that President Carter supports "relief across the board" for intelligence officers who have complained about the Freedom of Information Act.

Congress should rectify its own mistakes by restoring a clandestine capability to security agencies that it left half-dead and unable to look effectively after U.S. vital interests.

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In Summary

Vote Gives C.I.A. Ample Elbow Room

The debate on whether Central Intelligence Agency ought be unleashed may continue, but as a House Foreign Affairs Committee vote last week demonstrated, Congressional sentiment for less restraint on C.I.A. operations is so strong, the controversy will be mostly academic.

In revising, as expected, the so-called Hughes-Ryan amendment and giving the President discretion to order clandestine actions without informing Congress, the panel effectively unbuckled the agency's collar.

In a sense, the debate had been academic for some time. The amendment, passed with great flourish in 1974 as Congress tried to reclaim authority in foreign affairs and over intelligence abuses, had required the White House to give "timely" notice of covert operations. Because there was some question about whether "timely" also meant "prior," in 1977, it was disclosed last week, the Carter Administration sought, and got, a Justice Department opinion supporting its view that timely meant after the fact.

Nevertheless, the Administration and its friends on Capitol Hill argued that Hughes-Ryan, under which eight Congressional committees with more than 200 members could have been briefed on covert acts, shackled the agency. (A recent study revealed that in practice only 48 members were briefed.) The measure the House committee approved last week does not abolish briefings. However, only the select intelligence committees of both houses would be privy to them, and in "extraordinary" circumstances affecting the "national interest" or protecting agents' safety, the requirement could be waived.